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RELATIONAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY



STEVEN R. MORRISON ∗
ABSTRACT

“Relational criminal liability,” or one person’s criminal liability for the actions of another
by way of a group of which both individuals are a part, generates a fundamental tension
between collectivist and individualist approaches to liability. The collectivist approach,
which reifies the group qua group, enables individuals to be liable for the acts of the group
and the group to be liable for the acts of individuals. The individualist approach treats individuals qua individuals, holding them liable only for their own conduct.
This tension sounds both in moral philosophy and legal theory. As to philosophy, Michael
Bratman, Margaret Gilbert, and Christopher Kutz take an ultimately individualistic approach to assigning moral responsibility in a group context. John Searle, Raimo Tuomela,
and others posit irreducible collective bodies, capable of intent and agency distinct from those
of their individual members. As to legal theory, long-standing American legal norms treat
individuals as individuals, whereas work by George P. Fletcher and, more recently, Gideon
Yaffe and Jens David Ohlin suggest a collectivist turn.
This unresolved tension produces inconsistency, unpredictability, and normative failures
in the determination of relational criminal liability. This Article relieves that tension by
showing, through an exposition of the relevant moral philosophy, legal theory, and case law,
that an individualist approach best accounts for the concerns of collectivists and individualists alike. This account details the normative contours of relational criminal liability and
addresses legitimate concerns with that liability. Finally, it develops a normative test for
relational criminal liability and applies that test to a taxonomy of relational criminal liability, which includes the many theories of liability that fall under the relational label. It concludes that most, but not all, aspects of relational criminal liability are normatively justified
and that many of its criticisms are better understood as aimed not at the substantive liability
itself but at external failures that sound in procedure, interpretation, and sentencing.
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................
II. FROM GUILT BY ASSOCIATION TO RELATIONAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY ................
A. Guilt by Association...................................................................................
B. Collective Responsibility ...........................................................................
C. Relational Criminal Liability ....................................................................
III. CRIMINAL LAW NORMS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF COLLECTIVE
RESPONSIBILITY ................................................................................................
A. Mens Rea ...................................................................................................
B. Actus Reus .................................................................................................
C. Jettisoning Causation................................................................................
D. A Test for Liability ....................................................................................
E. As to Omissions Law .................................................................................
F. As to the Defense of Abandonment ...........................................................
IV. TESTING THE STRUCTURE OF RELATIONAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY ......................
A. Actor-Causer ..............................................................................................

636
640
640
644
647
651
652
657
661
663
666
667
669
669

 Copyright 2016, Steven R. Morrison.
∗ Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of Law. I thank the
participants of CrimFest 2015 and the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section
scholars workshop. Many people contributed their comments, including Albert Alschuler,
Miriam Baer, Greg Gilchrist, Lauryn Gouldin, Aziz Huq, John D. Inazu, Benjamin Levin,
Eric Miller, Anne Mostad-Jensen, Jens David Ohlin, Alice Ristroph, Laurent Sacharoff, Nirej
Sekhon, Alexander Tsesis, Robert Weisberg, and Gideon Yaffe. Great thanks to them for
their time and invaluable thought. Emily Donaher provided unparalleled editorial support,
conversation, and ideas. Finally, thanks to UND Law School Dean Kathryn R.L. Rand for
supporting the work that this Article required.

636

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:635

B. Charged Assistor—Realized ......................................................................
C. Uncharged Assistor—Realized ..................................................................
D. Charged Anticipator ..................................................................................
E. Uncharged Anticipator ..............................................................................
F. Charged Assistor—Unrealized ..................................................................
G. Compound ..................................................................................................
V. EXTERNAL FAILURES ........................................................................................
A. Formal Criminal Charges..........................................................................
B. Illusory Limits ...........................................................................................
C. Equal Culpability ......................................................................................
VI. CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................

670
673
675
677
678
680
682
683
686
688
689

I. INTRODUCTION
When is it justified to impose criminal liability on one individual for
the acts of another individual? When the individuals have no relationship, the answer is easy: never. 1 But when these two people are connected in relevant ways, the question of liability is live. It is also unanswered in any sustained way.2 This Article proposes to provide such
an answer.
The connection between the two people that this Article considers
begins with what I call a ‘purposive collective,’ which I define as ‘a collective that two or more individuals are a part of and by which the
individuals share some mutual intent to produce, or mutual awareness
of the potential for producing, some set of outcomes.’ Purposive collectives do not, on their own, inevitably generate criminal liability. They
do, however, entail potential liability because of the possibility of some
shared mens rea and actus reus.
Consider the hypothetical case of Chris and Meghan: they own a
home together, agree to paint it together, and further agree that Chris
will buy the paint and Meghan will buy the brushes. This makes them
engaged in a purposive collective, the intended outcomes of which are
to buy the paint, buy the brushes, and paint the house.
What if Meghan stole the brushes and Chris stole the paint? Would
each be criminally liable for the other’s criminal conduct? It’s not clear;
it would depend, for example, on whether one knew of or instructed
the other to commit the criminal act, or whether that other did so entirely on her own. While the Pinkerton doctrine might address this
specific question, the question also reflects a broader category of liability, which I call ‘relational criminal liability’ (‘relational liability’ for
1. ALAN NORRIE, CRIME, REASON AND HISTORY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO
CRIMINAL LAW 163 (3d ed. 2014) (Where “the relationship [between two people] has no preexisting legal basis, there is no duty to act. A man is not a murderer because he omitted to
relieve a beggar even if there was the clearest proof that the beggar’s death resulted from
the omission.”).
2. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 188 (1998) (“How one person can become complicitous in the acts of another is by no means obvious.”).
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short) and define as ‘one person’s criminal liability for the actions of
another by way of joint membership in a purposive collective.’
Relational liability is comprised of many crimes and theories of liability: Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) kingpin liability, co-conspirator liability for conspiracy or its target offence, aiding and abetting, accessory, Pinkerton, natural and probable consequences, RICO
conspiracy, vicarious responsibility, co-schemer liability, joint venture
theory, and combinations of these theories. Many of these bases of liability can be expressed either as formal charges or mere theories of
liability for other crimes. This Article defines the normative boundary
of this system of liability. 3
This definition depends upon resolving a fundamental philosophical and legal tension between collectivist and individualist accounts of
moral responsibility or legal liability. 4 As to philosophy, Michael Bratman, Margaret Gilbert, and Christopher Kutz5 have taken an individualist approach to moral responsibility that locates intent and agency
in individuals acting in groups. John Searle, Raimo Tuomela, and others posit irreducible collective bodies, capable of intent and agency distinct from those of their individual members. As to law, long-standing
American legal norms treat individuals as individuals, whereas work

3. This Article is also not about ‘guilt by association’ or ‘collective responsibility.’ Guilt
by association, properly understood, is a term used to discuss any negative inference drawn
against an individual merely for her association with unpopular others. Criminal conspiracy,
for example, does not entail guilt by association because it is based on more than mere association—it requires a criminal agreement. Collective responsibility refers to the questions of
whether an individual should be liable for the actions of her group, see Thomas R. Flynn,
Collective Responsibility and Obedience to the Law, 18 GA. L. REV. 845, 847 (1984), or
whether the group should be liable for the actions of an individual. Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1204 (1985). In American
law, these concepts are universally rejected; the former because guilt by mere association
stresses American social norms and the First Amendment, and the latter because American
law (with an exception for corporations, In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 83, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1989)),
has never recognized groups as entities subject to criminal sanction.
4. George P. Fletcher, Law, in JOHN SEARLE 85, 99 (Barry Smith ed. 2003) [hereinafter
Law] (“Legal theory has long struggled with the problem of collective intentions . . . .”).
5. I recognize that Bratman and Gilbert, along with Raimo Tuomela and John Searle,
provide the “four most influential theories of collective intentionality.” Sara Rachel Chant et
al., Introduction: Beyond the Big Four and the Big Five, in FROM INDIVIDUAL TO COLLECTIVE
INTENTIONALITY: NEW ESSAYS 1, 1 (2014). I do not apply the theories of Tuomela and Searle
in this Article because they, in contrast to Bratman’s and Gilbert’s individualistic approach
to collective intentionality, posit an irreducible collective intentionality, above and separate
from that of individual collective members. JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL
REALITY 23 (1995). For the same reason, I do not apply Philip Pettit and Christian List’s
thinking. See CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY, DESIGN,
AND STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS 19 (2011). Collective intentionality, while it may be true
philosophically, is not useful to evaluate relational criminal liability, which, as an aspect of
American criminal law, must normatively be based on an individual’s mens rea.
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by George P. Fletcher 6 and, more recently, Gideon Yaffe 7 and Jens David Ohlin 8 suggest a collectivist turn.
Broadly, this matters because the collectivist approach and the individualist approach each generates different initial presumptions of
liability: A collectivist would be likely to hold Chris and Meghan liable
for each other’s conduct subject to facts that defeat such liability,
whereas an individualist would presume no liability without facts that
establish it.
Neither collectivists nor individualists are categorical, and so a
more nuanced theory of liability is possible. This Article shows that an
individualist approach best accounts for the concerns of collectivists
and individualists alike.9 Its nuance entails revisiting the concepts of
mens rea, actus reus, and causation. As to mens rea, this Article advocates for liability where a defendant is reckless or worse,10 informed in
part by H.L.A. Hart’s “role-responsibility” concept. 11 As to actus reus,
it finds the defendant’s requisite conduct, in part, in what Michael
Moore refers to as acting to cause a particular state of affairs that gives
rise to another’s conduct, 12 and in Douglas Husak’s control principle,13
which provides another reasonable alternative to traditional actus

6. George P. Fletcher, Collective Guilt and Collective Punishment, 5 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 163, 168 (2004) [hereinafter Collective Guilt]; Fletcher, Law, supra note 4, at 99-100.
7. See generally Gideon Yaffe, Collective Intentionality in the Law, in THE
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK ON COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY (Marija Yankovic & Kirk Ludvig,
eds., forthcoming 2016) (positing that “several criminal law doctrines which justifiably mandate punishment do so in a way that can be adequately explained only by attributing the law
with a supporting theory of collective intentionality”).
8. Jens David Ohlin, Group Think: The Law of Conspiracy and Collective Reason, 98
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 147, 151 (2007) [hereinafter Group Think].
9. Alan Norrie’s quasi-Marxist account of the criminal law illustrates this point well.
Individualism, of course, offers the promise of retributivist justice based on liability only
where there is culpability, but Norrie seeks justice through a communal lens. NORRIE, supra
note 1, at 17-23. He wrote: “The present law of omissions with its narrow confines has its
roots in the nineteenth century’s stubborn refusal to imagine relations and duties between
people save on the narrow basis of a cash or contractual [relationship].” Id. at 157. This has
led to injustice for “social actors.” Id. at 30. This Article suggests, however, that it is the
criminal law’s attention to collectivism, rather than its dedication to individualism, that has
generated unjust assignments of liability. A turn to an individualist account of liability in
the context of a collective can protect individuals both as individuals and as “social actors,”
or those who act in a group.
10. LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A
THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 31, 41 (2009).
11. H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 213 (2d ed. 2008).
12. MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS,
AND METAPHYSICS 17 (2009).
13. DOUGLAS HUSAK, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 17, 36-41 (1987).
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reus. Finally, the Article jettisons the causation requirement. Apply-

ing the work of Hart and Tony Honoré,14 Moore, and others, causation
emerges as normatively unnecessary to ground liability 15 and impracticable in the relational liability context.
Ultimately, a defendant may appropriately be relationally liable for
the conduct of another person in a purposive collective when the defendant acts or refrains from acting with (1) the intent to facilitate the
other’s conduct; (2) knowledge that her action or omission from action
will more likely than not facilitate the other’s conduct; or (3) reckless
disregard for the substantial likelihood that her conduct or omission
from acting will facilitate the other’s action.16 This normative and retributivist test, while primarily individualist, accounts for the unique
reality of multiple-person criminal conduct. 17
Resolving the collectivist-individualist tension and drawing the
normative contours of relational liability is practically important for
three reasons.
First, the crimes and theories that comprise relational liability appear pervasively in the American criminal justice system.18 Second,
courts focus on and easily reject the separate concepts of guilt by association and collective responsibility.19 Because of this particular focus,
they discount the influence of run-of-the-mill relational liability and
14. H. L. A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed. 1985).
15. Alexander and Ferzan would apparently jettison the causation requirement for all
criminal liability, not just relational liability. ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 10, at 3.
16. I acknowledge that this test for relational liability appears to undermine traditional
omissions law, namely that individuals are not legally and should not normatively be responsible for the actions of another where they do not act vis-à-vis the other’s actions. I address this in detail infra Section III.e. I also leave aside the question whether each of these
theories of liability should generate the same or different degrees of blameworthiness and
punishment. I consider that question to be external to the structure of relational liability
and address it infra Section V.c.
17. Deborah Tollefsen might claim that this test “involve[s] the postulation of a set of
individual intentions (or attitudes of a certain sort) that have a common content and are
interrelated in specific ways.” Deborah Tollefsen, A Dynamic Theory of Shared Intention and
the Phenomenology of Joint Action, in FROM INDIVIDUAL TO COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY:
NEW ESSAYS 13, 13 (2014).
18. United States v. Reynolds, 919 F.2d 435, 439 (7th Cir. 1990) (explaining that conspiracy charges are “inevitable because prosecutors seem to have conspiracy on their word
processors as Count I; rare is the case omitting such a charge”); Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis
D. Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud: A Critical Examination, 52 ALB. L. REV.
637, 640 (1988) (“It is common for the same person to be sued both as a primary violator and
as an aider-abettor. It is not uncommon for a person to be held liable in both capacities.”);
Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1310 (2003) (suggesting that
more than 25% of all federal criminal prosecutions and a large number of state cases involved
prosecutions for conspiracy).
19. Which I discuss in detail infra Part II; see also Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S.
750, 772 (1946) (“Guilt with us remains individual and personal . . . . It is not a matter of
mass application.”); United States v. Polasek, 162 F.3d 878 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v.
DeDominicis, 332 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1964).
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therefore implicitly embrace a broad application of that liability. 20
Third, players in the American criminal justice system readily, and
often irrationally, read multiple-person criminal conduct as the unified
work of a cohesive entity, which permits expansive, but often unreasonable, relational liability. 21
Part II of this Article contextualizes its thesis by defining guilt by
association and collective responsibility and then moves to a description of relational liability. Part III provides a basis, grounded in philosophy and legal theory, for the Article’s approach to mens rea, actus
reus, and causation regarding relational liability. It also sets forth the
normative test for such liability and addresses legitimate concerns involving omissions law and the defense of abandonment. Part IV establishes the concrete structure of relational liability and evaluates it
against the test established in Part III. It concludes that most, but not
all, theories of such liability are normatively defensible. Part V rounds
the Article out, highlighting failures of procedure, proof, and comparative culpability that are external to the substantive structure of relational liability and negatively affect its operation.
II. FROM GUILT BY ASSOCIATION TO RELATIONAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY
American criminal law has confronted three different versions of
liability involving collectives: guilt by association, collective responsibility, and relational liability. The law categorically rejects the first
two, but a summary discussion of them is important to understanding
the third.

A. Guilt by Association
The law categorically rejects guilt by association, 22 which entails
liability based on mere association with a criminal individual or group,

20. Conspiracy may be proven by inference arising from a defendant’s single act, even
if the defendant knew only one other member of the conspiracy. United States v. Huezo, 546
F.3d 174, 180 (2d Cir. 2008). On largely the same evidence, a defendant may be found guilty
of aiding and abetting, in addition to conspiracy. United States v. Cowart, 595 F.2d 1023,
1030-31 (5th Cir. 1979). And such conduct can give rise to expansive and borderless Pinkerton liability. United States v. Hansen, 256 F. Supp. 2d 65, 67 n.3 (D. Mass. 2003).
21. Definitions triggering group liability can be difficult to apply. For example, one government agent has defined “street gang” as “an association of three or more individuals who
collectively identify themselves by adopting a group identity.” United States v. Norwood, 16
F. Supp. 3d 848, 855 (E.D. Mich. 2014). In another case, a violation of a regulation against
assembly in a National Forest was alleged against a group “composed of citizens who are
loosely affiliated.” United States v. McFadden, 71 F. Supp. 2d 962, 964 (W.D. Mo. 1999).
22. For example, David Cole and James X. Dempsey refer to the “unconstitutional”
principle of guilt by association. DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 58-64 (2003); DAVID COLE & JAMES
X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME
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and nothing more. The Supreme Court, for example, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project23 (HLP) countenanced individuals’ membership in foreign terrorist organizations—as long as they did not do anything to support that organization. 24 And in Gallo v. Acuna 25 the California Supreme Court upheld injunctions against gang members for
assembling together not because of the associational value of their assembly but because their “activities [were] directed in the main at trafficking in illegal drugs and securing control of the community through
systematic acts of intimidation and violence.” 26
To be sure, as to HLP, membership rights without the ability to
support the group of which one is a member seem illusory. And as to
Gallo, the question of an injunction against assembly prior to the commission of crime by individuals suggests an unconstitutional prior restraint on assembly rights. 27 But the aspirational statement that both
of these courts make is that guilt by mere association, without any
evaluation of mens rea, actus reus, causation, or criminality in general, is not acceptable.
The rejection of guilt by association has, however, remained of limited force because it is usually based either on attention to rare, highprofile political cases 28 or on an unclear and expansive definition of
guilt by association. Guilt by association is invoked, for example, to
criticize some criminal investigations, 29 DNA databases, 30 automobile

OF NATIONAL SECURITY

121 (2d ed. 2006). Jens David Ohlin bases criminal liability on “collective intentions” arising from “group deliberations,” but argues that “no adequate theory
explains how the act and intention of one conspirator can be attributed to another, simply
by virtue of their criminal agreement.” Ohlin, Group Think, supra note 8, at 147. And the
Supreme Court has declared that guilt by association “has no place” in the criminal law.
Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 19 (1966).
23. 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
24. Id. at 25-26 (2010) (The law “ ‘does not prevent [people] from becoming members
of the PKK and LTTE or impose any sanction on them for doing so’ . . . . Congress has
not . . . sought to suppress ideas or opinions in the form of ‘pure political speech.’ Rather,
Congress has prohibited ‘material support.’ ” (citations omitted)).
25. 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997).
26. Id. at 608.
27. See John Inazu, Unlawful Assembly as Social Control 6 (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
28. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920 (1982); Elfbrandt, 384
U.S. at 19; Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 178 (1951); Am.
Commc’ns Ass’n, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 433 (1950).
29. Linda E. Fisher, Guilt by Expressive Association: Political Profiling, Surveillance
and the Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 625 (2004).
30. Frederick R. Bieber & David Lazer, Guilt by Association; Should the Law Be Able

to Use One Person’s DNA to Carry out Surveillance on Their Family? Not Without a Public
Debate Say Frederick Bieber and David Lazer, NEW SCI., Oct. 23, 2004, at 20.
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searches, 31 and gang databases. 32 Both the blinkered former approach
and borderless latter approach risk the use of guilt by association as a
trope to refer simply to cases that someone doesn’t like. 33
Some views of guilt by association are more nuanced because they
justify liability for association where the defendant acts vis-à-vis the
association in a way that justifies liability. 34
For example, Bobby Chesney refers to conspiracy as “criminalized
association,” and contrasts this to “vicarious punishment.” 35 It appears
that, for Chesney, the latter may be normatively appropriate but the
former is not, since it leads to punishment “not for any specific conduct
by [one person], but for associat[ion] with” that person.36 But conspiracy liability is more than mere association; it entails a criminal agreement formed intentionally. Chesney’s take, therefore, differs from the
one this Article advances. He focuses on the First Amendment associational aspect of a collective, not the relational liability that can arise
from that association. While I share Chesney’s practical concern with
prosecuting conspiracies,37 this Article is meant to trace the theoretical
justifications for relational liability.
Christopher Yoo discussed the guilt by association inherent in antigang injunctions when the criteria for injunctions included whether
someone admitted to gang membership, bore a gang tattoo, or was
even an active participant in a gang. 38 For Yoo, however, injunctions
do not constitute guilt by association where they are based on intentional and active participation in illegal gang activities. 39
As another example, Brian Comerford rejects critiques of the material support for terrorism statute, explaining that “the law does not

31. David E. Edwards et al., Case Comment, Criminal Law—United States v. Bell: Rejecting Guilt by Association in Search and Seizure Cases, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 258, 258 (1986).
32. Joshua D. Wright, The Constitutional Failure of Gang Databases, 2 STAN. J. CIV.

RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 115, 130 (2005).
33. Note, Guilt by Association: Three Words in Search of a Meaning, 17 U. CHI. L. REV.
148, 160 (1949).
34. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920 (1982); Scales v. United
States, 367 U.S. 203, 227 (1961); Thomas I. Emerson & David M. Helfeld, Loyalty Among
Government Employees, 58 YALE L.J. 1, 138 (1948).
35. Robert M. Chesney, Civil Liberties and the Terrorism Prevention Paradigm: The
Guilt by Association Critique, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1408, 1434 (2003).
36. Id.
37. See Steven R. Morrison, Conspiracy Law’s Threat to Free Speech, 15 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 865 (2013) [hereinafter Conspiracy Law’s Threat].
38. Christopher S. Yoo, The Constitutionality of Enjoining Criminal Street Gangs as
Public Nuisances, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 212, 234 (1994).
39. See id. at 233.
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criminalize association with, but rather support of, terrorist organizations.” 40 In contrast to Chesney, who stresses the First Amendment
associational problems with charges like conspiracy—and who has discussed these problems in the material support context41—Comerford
discounts the patent conflict between criminal liability and First
Amendment associational rights generated by the HLP opinion.42 And
as HLP suggests, courts have not taken seriously the line of associational liability established in N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware 43 and
Scales v. United States. 44
There is, furthermore, an aspect of impracticality in Comerford’s
comment, since to associate with a group is virtually synonymous with
supporting it. And the government has not been eager to split this hair
when it comes to assigning criminal liability: In HLP, government attorneys suggested that a lawyer who files an amicus brief in support
of a foreign terrorist organization could be liable for material support.45 Once again, however, my purpose in this article is not to trace
the tension between relational liability and associational or other First
Amendment rights. It is, rather, to advance a theoretical argument
about the justifiable scope of relational liability.
Criticism of guilt by association is both too narrow and too broad. It
is too narrow when it is used to condemn the application of criminal
law only in rare, high-profile political cases. This ignores the pervasive
use of association in run-of-the-mill criminal cases. It is too broad
when it is used to condemn all sorts of governmental action, including
criminal investigations and forming levels of suspicion, when that action refers to groups or associations, even when the reference is relevant. In the end, the concept of guilt by association isn’t very helpful
because it serves to condemn obviously unjustifiable forms of liability
(those based on mere association), and it says little about other forms
of liability (those based on association plus something else) that may
or may not be defensible.

40. Brian P. Comerford, Preventing Terrorism by Prosecuting Material Support, 80
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 723, 734 (2005).
41. Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425 (2007).
42. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (holding that associating with foreign terrorist organizations in order to provide them with support for peaceful
and law-abiding activities constituted the federal crime of providing material support to
terrorist organizations).
43. 458 U.S. 886, 886-87 (1982) (holding that the First Amendment protects one’s association with a criminal group, as long as the individual engages in no criminal conduct nor
contributes to others’ criminal conduct).
44. 367 U.S. 203, 227 (1961) (providing a test for the extent of First Amendment associational rights in the context of a criminal group).
45. John D. Inazu, Advocacy and Association, 2013 UTAH L. REV. ONLAW 1 (2013).
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B. Collective Responsibility
Collective responsibility—the responsibility of a group for the acts
of an individual or of an individual for the acts of a group—has long
been used to govern small communities 46 and to refer to the moral imperative of nations and other groups to respond to major crises.47 The
notion of collective responsibility as a basis for criminal liability, however, emerged in the United States only in the mid-twentieth century. 48 Joel Feinberg, for example, in 1968, considered liability for conspiracy, aiding and abetting, and other forms of relational criminal liability, but framed his work as one of collective responsibility, writing
of the responsibility of “the whole group . . . for the actions of one or
some of its members.” 49
Corporate criminal liability is an expression of collective responsibility 50 because it entails liability of corporations and other legal entities for the crimes of their individual employees and agents.51 Individuals whose conduct gives rise to corporate criminal liability may also
46. Albert W. Alschuler, Ancient Law and the Punishment of Corporations: Of Frankpledge and Deodand, 71 B.U. L. REV. 307, 312 (1991) (“The institution of Frankpledge in medi-

eval England held all members of a group responsible for a crime committed by one of them.”);
Robert A. Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 HARV. L. REV.
193, 201 (1932) (noting “the intensely local character of early legal systems, including the fact
of collective responsibility of the community for acts done within its borders”).
47. Myer Cohen, International Government. By Clyde Eagleton. New York: The Ronald
Press Co. 1932, 43 YALE L.J. 518, 519 (1934); George H. Dession, Psychiatry and the Conditioning of Criminal Justice, 47 YALE L.J. 319, 331 (1938); C.D.P., Present Day Labor Litigation, 31 YALE L.J. 86, 87 (1921).
48. Possibly the first substantial mentions of collective responsibility as a theory of
criminal liability were implied in a 1940 Yale Law Review article, Morris R. Cohen, Moral
Aspects of the Criminal Law, 49 YALE L.J. 987, 1007 (1940), and a 1941 Harvard Law Review
article, Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, 55 HARV. L.
REV. 44, 59 (1941). But see Lamb v. People, 96 Ill. 73, 82 (1880), in which a trial court permitted a jury to find a defendant guilty on a collective responsibility theory. The Illinois
Supreme Court held this was error, requiring a connection more than mere membership in
the same group to assign liability.
49. Joel Feinberg, Collective Responsibility, 65 J. PHIL. 674, 677 (1968).
50. Corporate liability as collective responsibility was not a foregone conclusion; theorists in the early twentieth century “debated whether corporations are just groups of people
or actually constitute distinct entities separate from their members.” Mihailis E. Diamantis,
Corporate Criminal Minds, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2049, 2053 (2016).
51. United States v. Agosto-Vega, 617 F.3d 541, 552-53 (1st Cir. 2010); United States
v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1118-19 (D.C. Cir. 2009); United States v. Singh,
518 F.3d 236, 249 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Jorgensen, 144 F.3d 550, 560 (8th Cir.
1998); United States v. Investment Enters., Inc., 10 F.3d 263, 266 (5th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656, 660 (2d Cir. 1989); United States
v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 822-23 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 87778 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Carter, 311 F.2d 934, 941-42 (6th Cir. 1963). As a striking
example, prosecutors in the 2002 prosecution of the corporation Arthur Anderson had to
prove only that “any one of Anderson’s 28,000 U.S. employees” withheld or destroyed documents. Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the Arthur Andersen Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107, 108 (2006).
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be individually charged with a substantive crime, 52 and they may be
charged with a relational crime, such as conspiracy.53 They may even be
charged with aiding and abetting the corporation itself. 54 These various
theories of liability can get quite confusing; this Article clarifies the situation by setting corporate liability aside as an embodiment of collective
responsibility and focusing on relational liability, or liability that one
individual might be assigned for the conduct of another individual.
While the notion of collective responsibility in American law extended beyond the corporate realm,55 it for the most part attended primarily to state-sponsored crime in international law and the law of
war. 56 Most recently, the concept has been applied in the International
Criminal Court and was most salient in the Tadic case from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which introduced the crime of Joint Criminal Enterprise. 57 It has had virtually no
influence on run-of-the-mill American criminal cases. 58
Around 1990, philosophers began to produce sustained inquiries of
collective responsibility. 59 These inquiries engaged two questions.
First, could a collective have an intent and engage in conduct distinct
from the intent and conduct of its constituent members? Second, if it
could, how should the moral responsibility of individuals involved in
the intent and conduct of the collective be evaluated? These inquiries
52. United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 409 (1962) (“No intent to exculpate a corporate
officer who violates the law is to be imputed to Congress without clear compulsion . . . .”
(citing United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943)).
53. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1946); United States v. Clark, 717
F.3d 790, 808-09 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Sklena, 692 F.3d 725, 729-30 (7th Cir.
2012); United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 547 (5th Cir. 2009), aff’d in part and vac’d in
part on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010); United States v. Singh, 518 F.3d 236, 252-53
(4th Cir. 2008).
54. United States v. Sain, 141 F.3d 463, 474-75 (3d Cir. 1998) (“AEC, because it is a
corporation, is a separate legal entity, even though Sain owned all the stock. Thus, it has the
capacity of being aided and abetted.”).
55. See Gerald Dworkin, Doing and Deserving, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1317, 1322 (1971) (book
review) (noting that Feinberg’s “essay on collective responsibility brings sociology, law, and
philosophy to bear on an important and neglected issue”).
56. See Fletcher, Collective Guilt, supra note 6, at 168; Duane W. Layton, Forty Years

After the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals: The Impact of the War Crimes Trials on International and National Law, 80 AM. SOC’Y. INT’L L. PROC. 56, 63 (1986); see also Sanford Levinson, Responsibility for Crimes of War, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 244, 245, 249-50 (1973) (con-

sidering the dilemma of individual criminal conduct in collective contexts, and pointing to
domestic criminal law, including aiding and abetting and conspiracy, but focusing on
war crimes).
57. Jens David Ohlin, Joint Intentions to Commit International Crimes, 11 CHI. J. INT’L
L. 693, 697 (2011) [hereinafter Joint Intentions].
58. Again, I leave aside corporate criminal liability as an area of law that is unique. See
Edward B. Diskant, Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability: Exploring the Uniquely American Doctrine Through Comparative Criminal Procedure, 118 Yale L.J. 126, 129-30 (2008).
59. See MARGARET GILBERT, JOINT COMMITMENT: HOW WE MAKE THE SOCIAL WORLD
10 (2014).
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sought primarily to construct a theory of collective agency, not to account for individual members’ moral responsibility for the acts of fellow collective members. These inquiries, furthermore, were aimed at
determining an individual’s moral responsibility for the collective conduct, not criminal liability. The inquiry of relational criminal liability,
then, departs from that of collective responsibility in two ways: it seeks
to determine the scope of criminal liability, not moral responsibility, of
one collective member for the conduct of another collective member,
not for the conduct of the collective itself.
In a forthcoming book chapter, Gideon Yaffe addresses the question
of collective intentionality in the criminal law. 60 When “a person incurs
criminal liability for something he did not do thanks to the fact that
he is part of a group of people to whom [the act] is rightly attributed,” 61
Yaffe sees the potential for either a collectivist or an individualist response to determining liability. The collectivist response presumes a
“collective intentionality,” and the individualist response is based on
the presumption that the defendant has “made an individual, intentional causal contribution to the violation of a legally protected interest.” 62 Yaffe’s goal is to “adjudicate between” these positions. 63
He prefers the collectivist response for two reasons. First, that approach “unites a group of individuals to which [a] crime . . . can be
attributed.” 64 If A (the actual actor) raped a victim (an action a) and D
(the defendant who didn’t commit a but whose liability is in question 65)
held the victim down, according to Yaffe “it makes good sense to hold
[A and D] criminally liable for that crime, rather than for some form
of criminal aiding.” 66 Second, Yaffe believes that the individualist position is fatally flawed because supporters of that position must choose
between two untenable options: they must either deny that it is justified to hold D criminally liable for A’s action, or they must admit that
D’s liability is not for A’s action itself, but for some distinct action, like
aiding A’s action. 67 In the end, for Yaffe, the collectivist position is superior because it “allows us to say” that D “is criminally liable [for A’s
action] because he was in on it.” 68

60. Yaffe, supra note 7 (manuscript at 3).
61. Id. (manuscript at 4).
62. Id. (manuscript at 8-9).
63. Id. (manuscript at 9).
64. Id. (manuscript at 10).
65. I will use the nomenclature D, A, and a throughout this Article to refer to the defendant whose liability is in question (D), the actor whose conduct D might be liable for (A),
and the conduct in question (a).
66. Yaffe, supra note 7 (manuscript at 10).
67. Id.
68. Id. (manuscript at 13).
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C. Relational Criminal Liability
Yaffe’s preference for the collectivist position seems to rest on two
notions that I reject: that crime can be attributed to a group, separate
from the group’s members, and that collectives can have their own intentionality, separate from the intentionality of the collective’s members. I prefer the individualist position, and there is a third option to
Yaffe’s untenable two that individualists can adopt. His two options
presume that to be liable, D must somehow cause (or, perhaps, contribute to bringing about) a. Where A is the sole causer of a, D either
cannot be liable (option one) or his liability cannot “be taken at face
value [because i]t seems that we are holding [D] criminally liable for
[a], but his actual crime is distinct; it is the crime of aiding” the commission of a (option two). 69
The third option, which this Article adopts, is to jettison the causation requirement for D and determine D’s liability for A’s a based on
D’s actus reus and mens rea.70 This actus reus could be entirely
acausal, at least as a scientific matter, as where D aids and abets A’s
crime, or where D and A conspire to commit armed robbery, and in the
course of the robbery A shoots someone.
This liability bridges the divide between collectivism and individualism, which Yaffe seeks. It acknowledges both that individuals must
be judged as individuals to determine their liability, pursuant to accepted criminal law norms, and it also acknowledges that individuals
participate in collectives, and through that participation may contribute to others’ commission of criminal a’s.
To illustrate, consider two cases. In Commonwealth v. Azim,71 the
defendant was the driver of a car conveying two other men. 72 The three
men spotted the victim; the defendant stopped the car, and the two
other men exited the car to beat the victim. The Pennsylvania Supreme
69. Id. (manuscript at 10).
70. One of Yaffe’s major concerns with relational criminal liability is the causation requirement, and my rejection of its necessity. If D’s causation of a no longer needs to be
proved, then the thorny problems involving causation remain, but they are just shifted to
proving A’s causation of a. This problem is most salient when, for example, D and A have a
shared scheme and someone is harmed as a result of that scheme, but the evidence does not
show clearly that either D or A caused the harm. E-mail from Gideon Yaffe, Professor of Law,
Philosophy, and Psychology, Yale Law School, to Steven R. Morrison, Assistant Professor of
Law, University of North Dakota School of Law (Dec. 30, 2015, 11:29 CST) (on file with author).
My theory of relational criminal liability does not propose to solve the scientific causation
problem that Yaffe presents. It does, however, acknowledge Yaffe’s concern that someone
must have caused a. That person is A, and relational liability focuses on D’s liability, which
does not require causation. This approach works even where, for example, A might have
committed an “inchoate” crime such as attempt. While no harm will have been caused by
anyone, A will have caused the crime of attempt. I presume that it follows that a D who aided
the attempt may be liable for aiding in the commission of that crime.
71. 459 A.2d 1244 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983).
72. Id. at 1245.
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Court held that this evidence was sufficient to ground a conviction for
conspiracy to batter. 73 And in Commonwealth v. Cook, 74 the defendant
was convicted of conspiracy to commit rape because his friend actually
raped the victim, and the defendant held his friend’s belt while his
friend raped the victim.75 A Massachusetts appellate court held that the
evidence was insufficient as to the defendant’s rape charge. 76
Although each case generated a different outcome despite similar
facts, these cases can be viewed as consistent with each other and normatively grounded by evaluating the individual defendants’ mens rea
and actus reus in the context of a purposive collective. In Azim, the
Pennsylvania court found that the defendant could be liable because
he was the driver and because he was aware of the actual perpetrators’
intentions to beat the victim. 77 And in Cook, the Massachusetts court
found that the defendant engaged in no actus reus toward the crime of
conspiracy, nor did he have any requisite mens rea, being apparently
unaware of the actual rapist’s plan until its execution.78
In the end, the approach that this Article takes is not as divergent
from Yaffe’s approach as it seems because his thesis isn’t one that rejects individualism but rather one that embraces collectivism in order
to make sense of the problem he has with claiming that a D who does
not cause a is held by a guilty verdict to have committed a. 79
While I acknowledge this problem, an individualist account of relational criminal liability has four major advantages over Yaffe’s approach. As a matter of philosophic fact, individualist relational liability rejects what I claim to be the fiction of collective intentionality. 80
As a criminal normative matter, it treats all defendants as individuals
for purposes of assigning liability, as American criminal law requires.
As a matter of criminal procedure, it requires prosecutors to prove an
individual D’s guilt and discourages a conviction based on D’s guilt by
73. Id. at 1247.
74. 411 N.E.2d 1326 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980).
75. Id. at 1328.
76. Id. at 1329.
77. Azim, 459 A.2d at 1247.
78. Cook, 411 N.E.2d at 1329. To be sure, based on the defendant’s actus reus and mens
rea, the court held that the defendant could be implicated in the rape as an accomplice, Id.
at 1330, which seems to me to be the correct result.
79. Yaffe acknowledges that D can be liable for A’s a because D was “in on it,” but to
say that D actually committed a is factually wrong. If A stole and D helped, D did not ‘steal,’
but D can be “attributed with” the stealing. Yaffe, supra note 7 (manuscript at 13, 16). For
Yaffe, the collectivist position allows for a more semantically honest attribution of liability.
80. Kirk Ludwig, Is Distributed Cognition Group Level Cognition?, 1 J. SOC. ONTOLOGY
189, 190 (2015) (explaining that there is “no reason to think that extant forms of distributed
cognition involving groups of cognizers solving problems or performing tasks are instances
of group level cognitive processes”); see also infra, Section III.a.

2017]

RELATIONAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY

649

association with a potential criminal group. Finally, individualist relational criminal liability addresses the problem with claiming that “D
committed a,” where A actually committed a. Relational liability does
so by rejecting this fiction and holding D responsible only for her own
actus reus and mens rea vis-à-vis A in a way that connects D to a such
that D’s liability (for aiding and abetting, conspiring, or whatever) is
justified. Yaffe wants the law to recognize the distinction between
“stealing” (what A does) and “being responsible for stealing” (what D
does). 81 Individualist relational liability acknowledges that distinction;
Yaffe’s collective approach moves away from that because it conflates
two individuals into one causal entity.
The sustained philosophical debate between collectivists and individualists 82 has led Tracy Isaacs to advocate for a two-level analysis
that considers both individual- and group-level agency. 83 While Isaacs
may be correct as a philosophical matter—especially, perhaps, as her
thinking might apply to moral evaluations of massive wrongs like genocide 84—Jens David Ohlin, who is sympathetic to but skeptical of
Isaacs’ theory, sees three practical problems. First, positing collective
agency will render individuals either morally or legally not responsible
or responsible, both as individuals and as collective members.85 Thus,
individuals will either be let off the hook or will be, potentially, assigned too much responsibility for their conduct. Second, it is simply
unclear what it means to hold collectives criminally responsible at the
collective level. 86 Collective responsibility is, in other words, easier to
assign in theory than in reality. Third, Ockham’s razor 87 suggests a
strong preference for a solely individualist approach rather than a
more complex two-level analysis that includes a collective entity. 88
So, as a philosophical matter, Isaacs may be correct, but practicality
requires something else. Recognizing the individualist grounding of
relational criminal liability responds to both Isaacs’ philosophy and
Ohlin’s plea for a more workable approach. Relational liability recognizes that individuals act in collectives but retain individual agency

81. Ludwig, supra note 80.
82. Jens David Ohlin, The One or the Many, 9 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 285, 287 (2015) [hereinafter One or Many].
83. TRACY ISAACS, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN COLLECTIVE CONTEXTS 97-129 (2012).
84. Ohlin, One or Many, supra note 82, at 289-90.
85. Id. at 289.
86. Id. at 296-97.
87. Ockham’s razor is a philosophical principle that “gives precedence to simplicity: of
two competing theories, the simpler explanation of an entity is to be preferred.” Encyclopedia
Britannica, Occam’s Razor, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Occams-razor (last updated
June 4, 2015).
88. Ohlin, One or Many, supra note 82, at 287.
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and can be judged entirely as individuals. I make no claim that collective agency exists or does not exist as a philosophical truth; rather, I
contend that an individualist account of relational criminal liability is
possible 89 and preferable since it aligns most closely with the criminal
law norm of individual liability and discourages normatively unacceptable guilt by association.
Ohlin takes a different tack, positing the existence of group intentionality through which one group member’s conduct may be attributable to another. “Simply put,” he writes, “if one member of the group
commits an action that is caused by the group’s intention to commit
the crime, it is plausible to attribute the act to the group itself, and by
reverse extension, back down to each of its members.” 90
For Ohlin, this group intent-based form of liability can apply only
to tightly knit conspiracies and only for acts that are within the scope
of the criminal agreement 91 because only such groups will embody the
shared intent to commit such acts necessary for liability. Thus, any
form of Pinkerton that imposes liability based on a mens rea less than
intent is not justifiable. 92 Such liability, for Ohlin, “elude[s] coherent
explanation” 93 and is indefensible except on utilitarian grounds. 94
An individualist account, which requires a mens rea of recklessness
or worse, provides that explanation in the form of a retributivist critique of relational liability and, ultimately, a defense of most of its aspects. Instead of tracing liability from A through a group’s collective
intent to D, I account for liability via a direct A-to-D analysis. Just as
Margaret Thatcher once proclaimed, “there’s no such thing as society,” 95 this account has no need of a group intent to mediate A and D’s
individual intents and provide for D’s liability for A’s conduct.
This approach has three advantages over Ohlin’s. First, it applies
to all collectives, tightly knit or otherwise, and so it dispenses with the
fraught requirement of determining whether a group is tightly knit
enough to form a group intent. Second, any theory of group intent risks
guilt by association by imposing liability on D for A’s acts without a
89. In this, I differ from Ohlin’s tentative opinion that collective intentionality is irreducible to individuals’ intents, but we ultimately converge on a middle ground that promises
a practicable theory by which to assign criminal liability. Ohlin, Joint Intentions, supra note
57, at 738.
90. Ohlin, Group Think, supra note 8 at 155.
91. Id. at 151.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 153.
94. Id. at 159.
95. Margaret Thatcher: A Life in Quotes, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 2013),
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/apr/08/margaret-thatcher-quotes [https://perma.cc/
R6BE-6BRC].
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thoroughgoing individualist inquiry into D’s individual culpability.
This individualist approach avoids that risk. Third, it provides a defense of co-conspirator liability that responds to criminal law theory,
which Ohlin notes is lacking. 96
III. CRIMINAL LAW NORMS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF
COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY
While a broad array of background norms support criminal law,97 the
structure of relational liability can be evaluated primarily by reference
to three commonly accepted requirements to ground individualist liability: mens rea, actus reus, and causation. The test for relational liability
this Part sets forth is based on a reevaluation of these requirements.
This reevaluation generates a normative test for relational liability
that includes novel interpretations of the mens rea and actus reus requirements and a complete jettisoning of the causation requirement.
Indeed, causation and the need to jettison it inheres throughout this
Part’s discussion of mens rea and actus reus. These interpretations
respond to the structural exigencies of relational liability while remaining tethered to norms of criminal liability as expressed in more
traditional views of mens rea, actus reus, and causation.
The test does so by drawing a unified thread through the work of
legal scholars and moral philosophers. H.L.A. Hart’s “role-responsibility” concept 98 and the philosophers’ focus on individual mens rea, coupled with Larry Alexander and Kimberly Ferzan’s as well as Jerome
Hall’s defenses of recklessness as a sufficient mens rea 99 (where that
recklessness relates to the criminal result, not merely to a D’s general
effect on someone else) provide a workable account of mens rea in the
context of relational liability. Moore’s work on the actus reus of causing a particular state of affairs 100 (seconded by Douglas Husak’s control
principle 101) and his thoughts on accomplice liability do triple duty:
96. Ohlin, Group Think, supra note 8, at 150.
97. These include retributivist, deterrence, and utilitarian principles; proportionality;
desert; individual culpability; the rule of lenity; the harm principle; liability based on human
agency, Benjamin L. Berger, Emotions and the Veil of Voluntarism: The Loss of Judgment
in Canadian Criminal Defenses, 51 MCGILL L.J. 99, 103 (2006), or human control, HART,
supra note 11, at 210, and reference to community values and beliefs. Joel Feinberg, The
Expressive Function of Punishment, in WHY PUNISH? HOW MUCH? A READER ON
PUNISHMENT 113 (Michael Tonry ed. 2011); Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law
Care What the Layperson Thinks is Just? Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA.
L. REV. 1839, 1839-40 (2000); William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871,
1871-72 (2000).
98. HART, supra note 11, at 213.
99. ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 10, at 31, 41; JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES
OF CRIMINAL LAW 116 (2d ed. 1960).
100. MOORE, supra note 12, at 17.
101. HUSAK, supra note 13.
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they support the recklessness mens rea for relational liability, provide
a workable account of individual actus reus to ground such liability,
and anticipate a jettisoning of the causation requirement. Finally,
Hart and Honoré show directly how the causation requirement can defensibly be jettisoned.102

A. Mens Rea
Between mens rea, actus reus, and causation, mens rea is the element that has, for the most part, remained a requirement for criminal
liability. There is a set of crimes for which liability is strict, 103 and negligence is sometimes used as well, 104 which has recently raised calls for
reform. 105 But the use of these mens rea is still relatively rare in
criminal law.106
Intent, knowledge, and recklessness remain. 107 Where D acts pursuant to one of these mens rea and causes a to occur, liability for a is
easily grounded. Yet throughout criminal law, and especially as to relational liability, such mens rea and causation often do not exist.
Where collectivists get around this problem by positing a collective intentionality shared by all members of the collective, this approach
rests on assigning individual liability based on a mens rea in which
the individual is assumed, but not proven, to partake. The individualist approach avoids this lack of proof problem by accounting for the
mens rea held by D that suffices to ground her liability for A’s conduct.
H.L.A. Hart advocated for “role-responsibility,” which entails a D
who acts within a collective and is liable for a task assigned to him by
agreement or otherwise. 108 This is not, strictly speaking, relational liability since the D’s mens rea, actus reus, and causation all reside
within her.
102. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 14, at 17.
103. Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731 (1960).
104. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-105 (2016) (“Any person who causes the death of another
person by conduct amounting to criminal negligence commits criminally negligent
homicide . . . .”); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
105. S. 2298, 114th Cong. (2015); John Malcolm, The Pressing Need for Mens Rea Reform, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Sept. 1, 2015) http://www.heritage.org/research/
reports/2015/09/the-pressing-need-for-mens-rea-reform [http://perma.cc/U4Z8-8KYN]; John
Villasenor, Over-Criminalization and Mens Rea Reform: A Primer, THE BROOKINGS INST.
(Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2015/12/22-mens-rea-reformvillasenor [https://perma.cc/XN9Q-KGZQ].
106. Thomas “Tal” DeBauche, Note, Bursting Bottles: Doubting the Objective-Only Approach to 18 U.S.C. § 875(C) in Light of United States v. Jeffries and the Norms of Online
Social Networking, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 981, 990 (2014). But see Francis Bowes Sayre, Public
Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1933) (complaining of the use of strict liability for
certain crimes).
107. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
108. HART, supra note 11, at 213.
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Hart expanded this concept, arguing for liability where a D acted
with the belief that her conduct could lead to harm. 109 Liability could
attach, then, where a D caused a, but also where D performed an act
that he knew could result in a. 110 Hart implicitly invoked relational
liability by jettisoning the narrow, scientific causation requirement
and interpreting the actus reus requirement to include conduct that
the actor voluntarily performed, where the actor believed the conduct
would lead to a harmful consequence. 111
In support of the distinction between conduct “causing” and “resulting in” a harmful consequence, Paul Ryu highlighted the malleability
of each term and the need to refer to some external reference point to
come to a working definition of “causation.” 112 More recently, Eric
Johnson noted that only sometimes will actions that result in a consequence be deemed causes for purposes of imposing liability. 113 For example, Sanford Kadish found that one could be liable for the results of
her conduct if she caused the result or was complicit in the result.114
Philosophers known for their work on collective responsibility 115 suggest an even broader defense of relational liability than Hart suggested.
Christopher Kutz, Margaret Gilbert, and Michael Bratman each argue
for one person’s moral responsibility for the acts of another in certain
cases, and in similar ways. For them, moral responsibility always remains individual; if an individual contributes nothing to the conduct of
another in her collective, she cannot be responsible for that conduct
simply because she is part of the collective. 116 They, however, extend
moral agency of the individual beyond the bounds discussed by Hart,

109. Hart proposed that mens rea is satisfied by “intention or something like it,” Id. at 116,
writing, “[T]he law, though it may also be content with less, is content to hold a man guilty if
the harmful consequence, e.g. death, was foreseen by the accused in the sense that he believed
that it would come about as a result of some voluntary action on his part.” Id. at 119.
110. Id. at 210 (resting criminal liability on a defendant’s “knowledge or intention” or
“understanding and control”).
111. Id. at 119.
112. Paul K. Ryu, Causation in Criminal Law, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 773, 777-78 (1958).
113. Eric A. Johnson, Criminal Liability for Loss of a Chance, 91 IOWA L. REV. 59, 61 (2005).
114. Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of
Doctrine, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 327 (1985).
115. Also known as “joint commitment,” GILBERT, supra note 59, at 41; “shared agency,”
MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, SHARED AGENCY: A PLANNING THEORY OF ACTING TOGETHER 4 (2014);
“social reality,” SEARLE, supra note 5; and “group agency,” LIST & PETTIT, supra note 5.
116. As noted supra, some philosophers posit an irreducible collective intentionality
above and beyond the individual intentionality of the collective’s members. I do not deeply
consider these theories not because I reject them philosophically, but because they do no
useful work in individualistic American criminal law. See Robert D. Rupert, Against Group
Cognitive States, in FROM INDIVIDUAL TO COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY: NEW ESSAYS 97, 97
(2014) (arguing against collective cognitive states, because “if a group has mental states,
those states must do causal-explanatory work”).
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and deeper into the collective, because they embrace the notion that people operate simultaneously as individuals and as parts of collectives.
Kutz premises individual responsibility on one of three principles.
On the “Individual Difference Principle,” one is not responsible where
one has made no difference to an action’s occurrence. 117 On the “Control Principle,” one is not responsible where one could not have prevented the action. 118 And on the “Autonomy Principle,” one is not responsible for another’s conduct unless one induced or coerced the actor
into performing the act. 119
Kutz recognizes, however, that individuals play important roles in
collective endeavors that these three principles do not reach. He addresses this “I-We problem” not by abandoning the notion of individual
moral responsibility, but by expanding the scope of that responsibility
to allow for an individual’s “participatory intention,” which entails one
person’s “weak expectations” about another person’s plans plus “sufficient overlap among their participatory intentions.” 120 Where an individual intentionally contributes to a collective goal and another person
commits an act toward that goal, the first person may be morally responsible for the conduct of the second.121
Margaret Gilbert argues that each member of a collective is obligated to act “as appropriate” in response to a collective goal. 122 This
implies that each member must form “personal intentions that mesh
appropriately” with those of other members. 123 This makes sense because most collective plans do not explicitly specify everything that
must be done to realize them. 124 For Gilbert, there are “foundational
joint commitment[s]” and joint commitments involving “shared subplans,” which are plans that individual collective members carry out
in order to achieve the foundational plan. 125
Michael Bratman’s theory of “planning agency” begins with an individual’s desire to do something, and leads to the individual’s planning to do that thing, which then leads to “modest sociality,” or a
shared intention with another to do that thing.126 As with Kutz and

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE 3 (2000).

Id.
Id.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 104.
GILBERT, supra note 59, at 108.
Id. at 109.
Id. at 124.
Id. at 123.
BRATMAN, supra note 115, at 31.
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Gilbert, according to Bratman, moral responsibility attaches for an individual’s own plans and actions, but also for the plans and actions of
others that comprise “meshing sub-plans.” 127
These theories envision moral responsibility for the actions of another, but they offer only vaguely legally cognizable limits.128 For example, say D and A agree to commit an armed robbery. A illegally buys
a handgun. D is clearly responsible for this action because it’s necessary to achieving the shared goal of committing armed robbery. But
should, say, D be responsible for A’s purchase of an illegal automatic
weapon, which is contributory but not necessary to the shared plan?
Even more doubtful is that D should be responsible for A’s purchase of
a legal handgun with an illegal silencer.
Kutz’s work highlights the difficulty of establishing meaningful
limits. While he appears to embrace responsibility where someone
could reasonably foresee the conduct of a fellow collective member, he
also rejects Pinkerton liability. 129 He resolves that dilemma based on
epistemic practicality. As an abstract matter, Kutz might support
Pinkerton liability, but he also recognizes the reality that prosecutors
advertise many conspiracies as tightly-knit, dangerous groups that
are, in fact, comprised of attenuated relationships. 130 Given this practical reality, for Kutz “it is very hard to take this claim seriously” that
Pinkerton is a valid theory of liability. 131
While Kutz is correct as a practical matter, his abstract theory can
be finessed to produce a legally cognizable limit to relational liability.
Kutz limns relational moral responsibility by reference to an individual’s awareness of another’s conduct by excusing individuals from responsibility for the acts of others where those acts are “unintended
consequences” of a collective plan. One person may be responsible for
127. Id. at 53.
128. The limits that these philosophers place on relational moral responsibility are important, but are vague in their application. Kutz would require a “tight connection” between
one person’s participatory intention and another’s act, KUTZ, supra note 117, at 229, meaning that one person is not responsible for another’s action where that action is an “unintended consequence” of the shared agreement. Id. at 155. Thus, responsibility for the act of
another is not grounded if the act goes “beyond the pale of any reasonable collective expectation.” Id. Gilbert advances an epistemic warning, writing, “[A]ny steps directed against a
blameworthy collective must be taken with extreme caution, on pain of harming numerous
individuals who have little or nothing to answer for in connection with that collective’s action.” GILBERT, supra note 59, at 80. Bratman adds some relief to this general caution, noting
that his theory assumes symmetric authority relations, in which each member of a collective
is truly equal with all other members. BRATMAN, supra note 115, at 85. Kutz echoes this,
criticizing the fact that uniform sentences imposed on co-conspirators wholly fail to take into
account relevant differences between individuals’ participatory intentions. KUTZ, supra note
117, at 229.
129. KUTZ, supra note 117, at 215, 221.
130. Id. at 221.
131. Id.
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the conduct of another if that conduct can be reasonably expected to
result from collective intentionality.132
This implies that individuals who are reckless in relation to another’s criminal conduct—those who consciously disregard the risk of
another acting in such a way—should be relationally liable, but those
who are merely negligent of the possibility of the other’s criminal conduct—who unreasonably fail to be aware of the risks—should not be
liable. This line is reflected in the criminal law’s distaste for imposing
liability based on a mens rea less than recklessness, and is supported
by Alexander and Ferzan’s global theory of criminal liability, which
rests heavily on whether a defendant acted at least recklessly (and, in
fact, jettisons causation as a sine qua non of liability). 133 Jerome Hall,
furthermore, advocated for assigning liability only for a recklessness
mens rea or worse.134 Since he wrote that negligence entails “inadvertence” 135 and recklessness entails “voluntary harm-doing” or “at least
an awareness of possible harm,” 136 Hall’s conception of recklessness
reflects Hart’s belief that harm will result basis for liability, Kadish’s
complicity approach (which seems to imply a certain awareness of
probable consequences), Alexander’s focus on recklessness, 137 and the
philosophers’ various concepts of joint intention.
The question remains whether the requisite recklessness should be
subjective or objective. If subjective, then relational liability should be
grounded upon a D’s awareness that her conduct is sufficiently risky,
or the conduct is chosen. 138 If objective, then liability should be
grounded upon the conclusion that the D ought to know her conduct is
sufficiently risky and thus has the responsibility to find out about the
risks of the actions she performs.139
As an initial matter, deciding whether to take a subjective or objective approach to recklessness in the relational liability context seems
either to not have any substantive impact or to depend upon one’s a
priori preferences as to the recklessness mens rea as a part of the criminal law’s general part. Consider Pinkerton liability coupled with aiding and abetting: D aids and abets a conspiracy of which A is a member. The conspiracy’s aim is to rob a bank. A steals a car, which is used
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 155.

ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 10, at 31, 41.
JEROME HALL, LAW, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND CRIMINAL THEORY 244 (1982).
Id. at 246.
Id. at 246-47.
Larry Alexander, Criminal Liability for Omissions: An Inventory of Issues, in
CRIMINAL LAW THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 121, 125 (Stephen Shute & A.P.
Simester eds., 2005) (“inadvertent negligence is not culpable”).
138. Victor Tadros, Recklessness and the Duty to Take Care, in CRIMINAL LAW THEORY:
DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 227-28 (Stephen Shute & A.P. Simester eds., 2005).
139. Id.

2017]

RELATIONAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY

657

in the bank robbery. Under either a subjective or objective approach,
D will likely be liable for the bank robbery since she was aware of the
envisioned crime she was aiding. D should be liable for the car theft if
she recklessly disregarded the likelihood of that crime occurring. But
whether she should be held to a subjective or objective standard
depends upon what one thinks of each standard prior to considering
this particular D.
Upon further consideration, relational liability presents a unique
circumstance whose subjective / objective determination ought to be
sui generis. Depending as it does on D and A’s joint membership in a
purposive collective, it could be said that D, by joining the collective,
assumes a duty to find out about the risks that the collective’s members pose. D should perhaps, therefore, be subject to an objective evaluation of her potential recklessness.
This conclusion is arrived at not by the usual analysis of recklessness as part of criminal law’s general principles. Rather, it emerges as
an aspect of the special subset of criminal law that is relational liability. One might defensibly conclude, therefore, that subjective recklessness is appropriate in the general principles of criminal law, but that
the special subset of relational liability entails a carve out that calls
for an objective analysis. This exception is based on the D’s supposed
duty to know of the risks of her purposive collective that she assumes
when joining it. Failure to know of the risks of the collective amounts to
recklessness; the same failure operates as a positive actus reus to defeat
any potential conflict between omissions law and relational liability.140

B. Actus Reus
To provide an individualist account of relational liability, the actus
reus requirement should either be abandoned or reconceived. While

abandonment is an option, 141 the more conservative approach is to reconceive it. Michael Moore’s and Douglas Husak’s actus reus theories
help to do so.
Start with direct acting, in which a D performs a that, if done with
the requisite intent, comprises a crime. This narrow conception does
not, of course, address relational liability. Moore, however, finds the
requisite actus reus in D acting to cause a particular state of affairs
that gives rise to a as committed by another.142
This conception of actus reus is connected to the question of causation. Moore notes that the act requirement depends upon its status as
both absolute cause-in-fact and proximate cause, the latter of which
140. Infra Section III.e.
141. HART, supra note 11, at 90, 99 (expressing doubt that the criminal law, contrary to
the accepted view, in fact contains any real actus reus requirement).
142. MOORE, supra note 12, at 17.
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entails a policy-based evaluation of desert.143 It is only when a causein-fact is established that the question of proximate causation is engaged. Where there is no cause-in-fact, there can be no liability,
whether or not policy interests support it.144
This approach, valid for most aspects of the criminal law, cannot
apply to relational liability because the willful action of another will
normally be viewed as an intervening cause, eliminating the D as a
causer-in-fact. Nevertheless, Moore’s theory of proximate causation
does provide a relevant insight that can ground liability where there
is proximate causation but no causation-in-fact.
Moore presents three different versions of proximate causation. The
“ad hoc policy” test is premised on balancing certain “social interests.” 145 The “foreseeability test” asks whether conduct is foreseeable
to a defendant. 146 And the “ ‘harm-within-the-risk’ test” would lead to
liability where a defendant’s conduct generates a particular matrix of
risk, which in turn produces harm. 147 Each of these versions of proximate causation reflect the matrix of moral responsibility set forth by
Kutz, Gilbert, and Bratman; where the philosophers extended an individual’s mens rea to embrace responsibility for the acts of another,
Moore extends an individual’s actus reus to embrace situations in
which the individual contributes to the acts of another.
While the philosophers, discussing mens rea, above, end up implicitly adopting a recklessness requirement, Moore does as well,148
though he arrives at this requirement through his discussion of actus
reus. To understand how, start with Moore’s discussion of the five different types of accomplice.
First, “truly causal accomplices” (or “causal contributors” 149)
should be liable for the actions of others because they use these
others as tools to effect the conduct at issue. 150 These are accomplices who control everything, 151 and so can be said to have actually
caused the resulting conduct.152
143. Id. at 83.
144. See id.
145. Id. at 96.
146. Id. at 98.
147. Id. at 99.
148. Id. at 157 (quoting Justice Cardozo’s admonition that “[n]egligence in the air, so to
speak, will not do”).
149. Id. at 319.
150. Id. at 299.
151. Id. at 301 (these accomplices “pick[] the victim of the murder, order[] a subordinate
to do it, pay[] him well for it, locate[] the victim for the hit-man, bring[] the gun and ammunition, and drive[] the hit man [sic] to the location of the killing”).
152. Id. at 302.
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Second, “necessary accomplices” (or “necessary contributors” 153) are
those who did not cause the result, but without whom the result would
not have occurred. 154 Here, the accomplice should be liable because the
result “counterfactually depended” upon the accomplice’s action.155
Third, “chance-raising” accomplices (or “objective riskers” 156) are
those who by their actions do not cause the result but increase the risk
of a result to an unreasonable level. 157 These accomplices can be liable
because “to unreasonably risk is to be blameworthy, [with] the degree
of blame here . . . depending on the culpability with which the risking
is done.” 158
Fourth, “[s]ubjectively culpable accomplices” (or “culpable tryers” 159) are those who seek to assist another in committing a crime.160
These accomplices are liable where their actions amount to strong corroboration of their intent to commit a crime. 161
Fifth, “vicarious accomplices” are those who in no way acted, but
are blamed and held liable simply because they are associated with
someone who did act.162 Liability is in these cases undeserved. Moore
locates Pinkerton liability here. 163
Moore’s plea, in the end, is to uncouple the accomplice and principal
by eliminating the notion of accomplice liability, meaning that a defendant who does not commit the crime in question and the other person who does are treated as individuals.164 Each person would be
judged based on her own conduct; accomplices would no longer be
judged on the legal fiction that they committed the principals’ conduct.165 Recall that this implicates Yaffe’s concern with claiming that
D actually committed a crime, when in fact D merely contributed to
A’s commission of the crime. Yaffe’s solution is a collectivist one, but
Moore shows how an individualist approach is feasible.

153. Id. at 319.
154. Id. at 302-05 (For example, a defendant sees his enemy drowning and a lifeguard
preparing a rescue. The defendant quickly restrains the lifeguard, and the enemy drowns.).
155. Id. at 305.
156. Id. at 319.
157. Id. at 310.
158. Id. at 310.
159. Id. at 319.
160. Id. at 315. To be sure, these accomplices “do not causally contribute to some legally
prohibited result, nor are their acts or omissions necessary to that result occurring. Further,
their acts do not elevate the likelihood of the harm occurring.” Id. at 314.
161. Id. at 315-16.
162. Id. at 318-19.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 322.
165. Id. at 320.
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Douglas Husak, in turn, provides an alternative “control” principle
to that of actus reus. 166 Under Husak’s theory, a D might be liable for
something over which he had control (but didn’t necessarily act to produce or cause to occur). Thus, omissions may in some cases stand in
for an actus reus.167 Put another, broader way, the actus reus “requirement is designed to ensure that persons are liable only when they are
responsible.” 168 This means, at the very least, that a D may be liable
for something when he “performs a voluntary act, intending, knowing,
or consciously disregarding the risk that it will cause him to perform
a subsequent nonvoluntary criminal act.” 169
It can also reasonably mean that a D’s voluntary entry into a purposive collective that has a criminal aim can result in D’s liability for
certain criminal results of that collective, even if D didn’t voluntarily
act to bring them about, but if D recklessly acted such that they occurred through the actions of A.170
The use of Moore’s theory to evaluate the structure of relational liability suggests that individuals who act in collectives would be liable,
if at all, based only on their own conduct, but could be liable for this
conduct if it is reckless vis-à-vis the conduct of others. Truly vicarious
accomplices would not be liable, because they don’t act in any way in
relation to the criminal conduct of another. Truly causal accomplices
would be liable because they act with the pure intent to generate the
criminal result.
Those accomplices in the middle of these two extremes should be
judged by a recklessness standard. We know this for a number of reasons. First, Moore rejects negligence-based Pinkerton liability. Second,
he would premise liability on a defendant’s active conduct vis-à-vis another’s criminal activity (and not a defendant’s negligent ignorance of
her contributions to another’s criminal activity). Third, he would
premise liability on a defendant’s conduct that is strongly corroborative of an attempt to assist another in committing a crime. Recklessness implies a defendant’s active participation (if only by consciously
ignoring his role in risk-production) in another’s criminal conduct.
Conduct that reflects this active participation can be said to be reckless, and thus satisfies the actus reus requirement.

166. HUSAK, supra note 13.
167. Id. at 84.
168. Douglas Husak, Rethinking the Act Requirement, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2437, 2454
(2007).
169. Id. at 2457.
170. To be sure, this does contradict Husak’s opinion that, under the control principle,
even negligent acts and omissions may ground liability. See HUSAK, supra note 13, at 136.
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C. Jettisoning Causation
Causation at base entails an individual D performing a criminal a
or performing another action that is the intended cause-in-fact of a and
results in a. While the doctrine qui facit per alium facit per se operates 171 to produce some relational liability, it is limited to situations in
which an A is D’s mere instrument, much as a servant is said to be the
legal instrument of a master. 172 It therefore does not ground many
forms of relational liability, including, for example, a co-conspirator’s
liability for the conduct of her fellow, who commits the crime envisioned by the conspiracy.
As with actus reus, causation can be modified to suit individualist
relational liability by expanding or jettisoning it. 173 Unlike actus reus,
the causation requirement can be effectively dispensed with, which a
number of scholars have suggested. 174 This means that relational liability is comprised not of what A.P. Simester and Stephen Shute would
call “result crimes,” but of normatively grounded “conduct crimes.” 175
H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré advanced Mill’s notion of causation,
in which the law does not discern the cause of an occurrence (because
there is never a single cause) but normatively selects a contributing
causal factor from an array of contributing factors to label as cause.176
We typically look for a Sole Causal Event, but should embrace the “doctrine of the plurality of causes.” 177 This means that a causation determination is a normative endeavor 178 and that causation of harm is neither always necessary nor sufficient to ground liability. 179
171. Francis Bowes Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 HARV. L.
REV. 689, 690 (1930) [hereinafter, Responsibility]; see also Michael B. North, Qui Facit Per
Alium, Facit Per Se: Representation, Mandate, and Principles of Agency in Louisiana at the
Turn of the Twenty-First Century, 72 TUL. L. REV. 279, 287 n.50 (1997) (Latin translated as
“[w]hoever acts through another acts as if he were doing it himself.”).
172. Sayre, supra note 171, at 693.
173. Like Moore’s work, Husak’s control principle can stand in for actus reus and causation alike. See HUSAK, supra note 13, at 170 (“I suggest that the control principle is a preferable alternative to the causal requirement of orthodox criminal theory.”).
174. Michael Moore, as discussed above, would likely premise liability on a D recklessly
causing a particular state of affairs that itself generates the probability of harm. Francis Sayre
suggested that a “natural and probable consequence” test for liability could stand in for causation. Sayre would premise liability not on strict causation, but on these consequences, or on
“knowledge plus acquiescence.” Sayre, Responsibility, supra note 171, at 699, 702.
175. A.P. Simester & Stephen Shute, On the General Part in Criminal Law, in CRIMINAL
LAW THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 1, 2 n.5 (Stephen Shute & A.P. Simester
eds., 2005) (“By ‘result crime’, we mean crimes that specify the causing of a consequence as
part of their actus reus. ‘Conduct crimes’ refer to behaviour by the defendant but not to
its consequences.”).
176. HART & HONORÉ, supra note 14, at 17.
177. Id. at 19.
178. Id. at 65-66 (causation determination “is a disguised way of asserting the ‘normative’ judgment that [someone] is responsible”).
179. Id. at 67.
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If strict causation as a requirement is jettisoned, as it should be,
liability might be imposed for what could be called a contributory alternative, in which a D is liable for contributing to a criminal outcome
(assuming the requisite mens rea and actus reus) as one of a set of
factors. But this approach would save some culpable people from liability. Consider three people who agree to steal people’s identities and
open credit card accounts in their names. They all agree that D1 and
D2 would obtain identifications from data service providers, and A
would actually open the credit card accounts. D1 and D2 do so, but A
ultimately uses only the information that D2 provides. Under the contributory alternative, D1 might escape liability.
The law could instead impose liability based on an attempted contributory alternative, in which a D is liable for attempting to contribute, whether or not she actually contributes. This is, in fact, inherent
in the test for relational liability I propose below. It also entirely jettisons the causation requirement. Assuming that D acted with at least
recklessness, it should not matter whether D caused or even contributed to A’s action. 180
This is so even when jettisoning causation is evaluated against expansive definitions of causation. Jerome Hall, for example, offered that
one definition of “cause” was “giving a person a motive to act—to cause
[him] to act means to persuade or coerce him to act or to proceed in
other ways which foreseeably give him a ground or incentive for action.” 181 He went on to note that intervening causes that still ground
liability for the non-acting D include situations in which the D’s “conduct motivates other persons (sometimes the victim) to act, and their
conduct is the immediate cause of a death.” 182 To ground liability,
“[t]his type of causation is limited to interpersonal relations and . . .
must be sharply distinguished from causation in the biological and
inanimate realms.” 183
Hall’s definition of causation departs far from most individuals’ conception of causation and is foreign to a conservative reading of that
requirement. It seems more efficient to jettison the requirement. Hall
does, however, point directly to relational criminal liability by applying his definition of causation only to “interpersonal relations.” 184

180. Hart and Honoré would likely support this approach, because they look to the reasons someone acts instead of causation. Id. at 51. I acknowledge that Hart and Honoré’s
theory isn’t without its detractors, see HUSAK, supra note 13, at 165, but for my purposes

their thoughts are relatively uncontroversial.
181. JEROME H ALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES
[hereinafter PRINCIPLES].
182. Id. at 262.
183. Id. at 251.
184. Id.
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D. A Test for Liability
Built upon the legal theory and moral philosophy discussed above
is a practicable normative test for evaluating theories of relational liability that looks to a D’s own mens rea and actus reus, requires a
mens rea of at least recklessness, and jettisons the need to prove causation. This proposal is a conservative one because it remains closely
tethered to traditional criminal law norms, but it also is crafted to respond appropriately to the structure of relational liability. It can be
stated as follows:

Liability for the acts of another:
I. A defendant may be liable for the criminal act of another if
a.

The defendant acts or refrains from acting with the intent
to facilitate the criminal action of another;

b.

The defendant acts or refrains from acting with the
knowledge that his acting or refraining from acting is more
likely than not to facilitate the criminal action of another;
or

c. The defendant acts or refrains from acting with conscious disregard for the substantial likelihood that his acting or refraining from acting will facilitate the criminal action of another. 185

This proposal is based upon four criteria.
First, D and A’s joint membership in a purposive collective does not
depend upon mutual agreement to facilitate or even mutual knowledge
of the other’s existence. This is the Tally problem presented in State
185. This test does not consider liability of D for the actions of A when D and A do not
operate in a purposive collective. D could, for example, unbeknownst to A, seek to assist A
in committing a crime. Conspiracy to provide and attempt to provide material support to a
foreign terrorist organization is an example. In one material support case, a prominent government expert advanced his theory of unconnected support:
[A]l Qaeda is not just an organization. Al Qaeda also views itself as an ideology.
It hopes to encourage people around the world who are unable to travel to places
like Afghanistan or Somalia or wherever else, it hopes to encourage those people
to do what they can at home.
Particularly after 9/11, there was a tremendous emphasis on the training camps
are closed [sic]. You can’t just come to Afghanistan now to get training and go
home. Now the battle is in your own backyard. The battle is what you yourself
are able to do with your own abilities, so you should do whatever you can. It is
an individual duty upon you to participate in the struggle. It is not about Usama
Bin Laden and it’s not about al Qaeda. It is about the methodology and the ideology behind them. If you follow the same methodology and the same ideology,
then you too can be al Qaeda.
United States v. Kassir, No. 04 Cr. 356(JFK), 2009 WL 2913651, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2009).
Such crimes are not part of the structure of relational criminal liability, and are thus not
treated in this Article. These crimes could, however, be considered on their own, as part of
what could be called the structure of ‘a relational criminal liability.’
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ex rel. Martin v. Tally,186 in which the defendant was convicted of aid-

ing and abetting a murder where the murderers were not aware of the
aiding and abetting. 187 Subsequent courts have affirmed the possibility
of D’s liability for aiding and abetting A in such cases. 188
Tally liability, however, is still relational liability because purposive
collectives entail shared, overlapping intentions that members collectively work toward, but not necessarily awareness of these intentions.189
Consider a D and A who decide to commit armed robbery of a bank. D
inserts a virus into the bank’s computerized security system, and A purchases illegal weapons, both of which are illegal acts. Both will clearly
be liable for each other’s criminal act. Unbeknownst to A, D also places
a set of car lock picks into A’s backpack, thinking that it will help A steal
a car. A discovers the lock picks, believing that she left them there from
a previous heist. She uses the picks to steal a getaway car. D had a
Kutzian weak expectation that A would steal the car, and D and A implicitly shared a Bratmanian meshing sub-plan to steal the car. D’s facilitation did not depend on A being aware of the facilitation.
Second, liability based on negligently acting or failing to act is impermissible. Although the Model Penal Code embraces such liability,
negligence is in fact rarely used to ground criminal liability 190 and generally must be explicitly stated by statute. 191 Drawing the line at recklessness tracks the work of the criminal law scholars and philosophers
of collective responsibility, who tend to justify liability (or moral responsibility) on a D consciously acting or recklessly failing to act in a
way that facilitates another’s criminal conduct, rather than a D failing
to realize the harmful potentiality of her conduct.
This means that a D ought not be liable where the D merely knows
of and acquiesces to A’s performance of a. This is so because knowledge

186. 15 So. 722 (1894).
187. Id. at 724.
188. Chisler v. State, 553 So. 2d 654, 665 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (allowing for “accomplice
liability in the absence of a conspiracy or an agreement between the parties”); Seward v. State,
118 A.2d 505, 507 (Md. 1955); State v. Nutley, 129 N.W.2d 155, 167 (Wis. 1964). But see United
States v. Beck, 615 F.2d 441, 448-49 (7th Cir. 1980) (“[Aiding and abetting] has two prongs—
association and participation. To prove association, there must be evidence to establish that
the defendant shared in the criminal intent of the principal.” (citations omitted)).
189. Kutz’s “weak expectations” about another person’s plans plus “sufficient overlap
among their participatory intentions,” Gilbert’s view that each member of a collective is obligated to act “as appropriate” in response to a collective goal, and Bratman’s “meshing subplans” all suggest, but do not appear to require a conscious meeting of the minds regarding
shared intent—they only require the shared, overlapping intent itself. See sources cited supra notes 120, 122, and 126.
190. DeBauche, supra note 106, at 990.
191. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 116-17 (“If the relevant statute is silent, the minimally
required form of culpability is recklessness . . . . [I]n the common law tradition, negligence is
a suspect basis of liability.”).
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alone of another’s potential (or likely) conduct entails no mens rea visà-vis that conduct. Where, however, there is knowledge plus the requisite mens rea to facilitate, then liability is justified.192
Third, causation as a concept must be jettisoned. Relational liability nearly always entails an A acting as an intervening cause between
D’s action and a. A causation requirement would render virtually all
relational liability unjustifiable.
Some might think that jettisoning causation could result in liability
for one’s mere intent alone. This is not so, since the actus reus requirement remains. 193 Furthermore, causation in criminal law is arguably
an oversold concept. The very meaning of causation has for a long time
been the subject of controversy 194 and has, in criminal law, remained
underdeveloped. 195 Causation has, indeed, always been as much a normative inquiry as a scientific one.196 This normativity allows scholars
to finesse their notions of causation to suit their theories of punishment. 197 It also permits the position that causation is entirely unnecessary to determine liability and ground culpability. This position is
based on the notion that it makes little sense to require actual harm
to ground criminal liability; a person’s bad intent coupled with requisite conduct connected to that intent (whatever harm it causes or does
not cause) should be enough.198 Causation can normatively be jettisoned, and it must be jettisoned if relational liability is to function.199

192. For example, my mere knowledge of a genocide on another continent does not make
me liable for a warlord’s murder of a civilian—even if I might have sponsored the civilian’s
visa to the United States. However, if I am a friend of the warlord, he has asked me not to
sponsor a visa, and I respond favorably to his request, I may be liable because I am now in a
purposive collective with the warlord and may be said to facilitate his murderous action
(whether intentionally or recklessly).
193. To be sure, evidence of one’s “agreement” with another, as in conspiracy law, can be
fleeting and unclear, which justifiably draws the ire of critics, including me. Morrison, Conspiracy Law’s Threat, supra note 37. This evidentiary problem, however, is external to the
structure of relational liability, and is thus not the focus of this Article.
194. Ryu, supra note 112, at 775.
195. Brackett v. Peters, 11 F.3d 78, 82 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he doctrine of causation is
more developed [in tort law] than in criminal law.”).
196. Arthur Leavens, A Causation Approach to Criminal Omissions, 76 CALIF. L. REV.
547, 564-65 (1988).
197. Lawrence Crocker, A Retributive Theory of Criminal Causation, 5 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 65, 66 (1994).
198. Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 30
(1994); Sanford H. Kadish, Foreword: The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679, 686 (1994); Stephen J. Morse, The Moral Metaphysics of
Causation and Results, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 879, 881 (2000). But see Jerome Hall, Science
and Reform in Criminal Law, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 787, 800 (1952) (“Causation, another
principle of criminal law, is meaningful in explanation of the relation between conduct
and harm. If harm is excluded, causation becomes meaningless.”).
199. To be sure, a causation requirement may serve as a proxy indicator for mens rea,
protecting defendants against charges that are readily, but unreliably, provable. See Allen
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Fourth, relational liability must be found in a D’s own conduct and
intent. This conservative approach maintains the law’s focus on individual culpability and permits the imposition of normatively appropriate relational liability.

E. As to Omissions Law
The test for relational liability may be viewed as rejecting omissions
law, pursuant to which an individual has no obligation to act to prevent the crime of another, even if the failure to act will serve the criminal endeavors of the other. 200 The test for relational liability, in fact,
does not reject this, because both the test and omissions law imply no
liability where D and A are not in the same purposive collective. Where
D and A are in the same purposive collective, both the test and omissions law permit largely overlapping liability.
Omissions come in different forms—some are liability-grounding,
some are not. 201 While it can be difficult to discern which omissions are
actionable and which are not, 202 the typical approach is to ground liability for omissions where there is a legally imposed duty to act. 203 The
difficulty of discerning which omissions generate liability and which
do not often entails a normative question as to which legal duties to
act are appropriate to impose on individuals.204

R. Friedman, Aiding and Abetting the Investment of Dirty Money: Mens Rea and the Nonracketeer Under RICO Section 1962(a), 82 COLUM. L. REV. 574, 574 (1982) (The “central
problem” of allowing nonracketeers to be convicted under RICO is “whether such persons,
whose actions in aid of investments may be blameless except for the origin of the money
being invested, act with the requisite mens rea to criminalize their conduct.”); George C.
Thomas III, A Blameworthy Act Approach to the Double Jeopardy Same Offense Problem,
83 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1047 (1995) (Continuing Criminal Enterprise “is defined without
mens rea. . . . The predicate[] [acts] thus function . . . as a stand-in for mens rea.”); Note,
Developments in the Law: Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 935-36 (1959) (it
would be difficult “to conceive of any crime in which the intent is less specific” than conspiracy). This is, however, an evidentiary problem and is thus external to the system of relational
liability that this Article evaluates. Moreover, if relational liability did entail a causation
requirement, it is difficult to see how prosecutors would be prevented from prosecuting virtually all defendants who might be relationally liable.
200. Francis Barry McCarthy, Crimes of Omission in Pennsylvania, 68 TEMP. L. REV.
633, 633 (1995).
201. Jacobo Dopico Gómez-Aller, Criminal Omissions: A European Perspective, 11 NEW
CRIM. L. REV. 419, 420-21 (2008) (noting the difference between “commission by omission”
and “pure omission”); Jesús-María Silva Sánchez, Criminal Omissions: Some Relevant Distinctions, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 452, 452 (2008) (noting the difference between “simple omissions” and “inauthentic omissions,” or “commission by omission”).
202. Leavens, supra note 196, at 548-49.
203. State ex rel. Kuntz v. Mont. Thirteenth Judicial Dist. Ct., 995 P.2d 951, 955 (Mont.
2000); Commonwealth v. Pestinikas, 617 A.2d 1339, 1344 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); State v. Williquette, 385 N.W.2d 145, 150 (Wis. 1986); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
204. Leavens, supra note 196, at 548-49.

2017]

RELATIONAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY

667

The test for relational liability does impose liability for a D’s reckless
failure to act in the context of a purposive collective. Put another way,
the test sometimes imposes on D a duty to act to prevent or mitigate A’s
criminal conduct. By virtue of the D and A’s purposive criminal collective, this duty seems to me to be generally normatively appropriate.205
Imposing a duty to act suggests that a D’s omission can be considered a normatively inappropriate act that contributes to A’s a, and
thus grounds liability. 206 Where there is a purposive criminal collective, such a duty is appropriate in certain circumstances. For example,
if a D is charged with conspiracy to commit armed robbery and A steals
a getaway car, proof of the conspiracy implies D’s dual and related duties: to act so as to prevent or mitigate any criminal conduct that is a
reasonably foreseeable aspect of the conspiracy, and to not act for the
same purpose. If D, then, fails to act such that the failure may facilitate
the criminal conduct, and D does so at least recklessly, it seems normatively appropriate to impose liability on D for that conduct. Proof of the
purposive criminal collective entails the legal duty to act such that an
omission may be viewed as a liability-grounding commission.207

F. As to the Defense of Abandonment
It could be argued that jettisoning causation means that the defense of abandonment (also known as withdrawal 208 or renunciation209)
is essentially nullified. 210 While this argument makes initial sense, it
can ultimately be dismissed.
Abandonment is supposed to provide would-be criminals with a locus poenitentiae, 211 or a space for someone who has formed a criminal
205. If one who commits a crime owes a “debt” because of her guilt, Fletcher, Collective
Guilt, supra note 6, at 168, it makes sense to impose a duty on that person to mitigate or

avoid incurring increasing amounts of debt prior to punishment. Alan Norrie, furthermore,
would impose liability “for an omission to an individual or individuals on the basis not of
what was done, but in terms of an additional relationship giving rise to the need for an act.”
NORRIE, supra note 1, at 152.
206. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 45 (“[T]he lack of human agency is not the problem expressed in the widespread anxiety about punishing omissions. There is agency and in this
sense action in choosing nothing or choosing to do something.”); HALL, PRINCIPLES, supra
note 181, at 247 (“[W]hile, in a physical sense, an omission cannot of itself produce any external harm, nevertheless in law, as in everyday ethics, under certain conditions, personal
forbearance is regarded as making use of external objects and forces.”).
207. The purposive collective would thus entail a special relationship that gives rise to
legal duties. See HUSAK, supra note 13, at 166 (“No one doubts that liability is just in cases
involving ‘special relationships,’ for instance, when a parent deliberately and maliciously
starves his infant to death.”).
208. See Smith v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 714, 718 (2013).
209. See Thomas v. State, 708 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Tex. Crim. App.1986).
210. See Carroll v. State, 680 So. 2d 1065, 1066 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
211. Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Beyond Crime and Commitment: Justifying Liberty Deprivations of the Dangerous and Responsible, 96 MINN. L. REV. 141, 165 (2011); DAD Notes,
1987 ARMY LAW. 47, 48 n.21.
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mens rea to reconsider, back out of completing a crime, and thereby

avoid liability. 212 The argument therefore makes initial sense because
the test for relational liability seems to expose Ds to liability much
earlier in their criminal endeavor than current law provides. Furthermore, the requisite actus reus under the test for relational liability can
be quite preliminary and practically unimpactful. As such, there may
be a very small locus poenitentiae for a D to form a criminal mens rea
and then, say, withdraw from a conspiracy or abandon an attempt to
aid and abet another.213 Thus, while the test for relational liability does
not formally reject abandonment, it may practically eliminate the opportunity for it to operate as intended.
This concern, however, rests on a misunderstanding of the test for
relational liability as defining conduct that amounts to criminal liability, as if the test itself were a criminal law. The test in fact applies to
extant crimes of relational liability. It does not redefine the elements of
any crime. Rather, it makes a normative argument that some forms of
relational liability are defensible, and others are not. With no elemental
redefinition, the space for locus poenitentiae remains unaltered.
Furthermore, just as the test for relational liability does not redefine elements of crimes, it also does not abrogate statutes providing for
abandonment. Laws like those in Minnesota, 214 Pennsylvania, 215 and
others 216 provide detailed prescriptions governing the defense. These
laws protect defendants more than the test for relational liability
would and, in any event, these statutes are legally in force, whereas
the test for relational liability merely defines the furthest normatively

212. Robert Batey, Minority Report and the Law of Attempt, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 689,
694 (2004).
213. Ronald J. Allen, Structuring Jury Decisionmaking in Criminal Cases: A Unified
Constitutional Approach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 HARV. L. REV. 321, 343 n.83 (1980) (“To
say that a locus poenitentiae should be provided is to say that a defendant should have a
chance to change his mind if he is going to. Thus, the purpose of a locus poenitentiae is to
provide yet another means to ensure to the extent feasible that the defendant is in fact embarked on a path of criminality from which he most likely will not stray.”).
214. MINN. STAT. § 609.05, Subdiv. 3 (2017) (“A person who intentionally aids, advises,
hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures another to commit a crime and thereafter abandons that purpose and makes a reasonable effort to prevent the commission of the
crime prior to its commission is not liable if the crime is thereafter committed.”).
215. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 903(f) (2017) (“Renunciation.—It is a defense that the actor,
after conspiring to commit a crime, thwarted the success of the conspiracy, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal intent.”).
216. HAW. REV. STAT. § 705-525 (2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:5-2(2)(f) (West 2016).
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defensible extent of criminal liability in the relational context. Abandonment and the test for relational liability are therefore of different
natures and are not mutually exclusive. 217
IV. TESTING THE STRUCTURE OF RELATIONAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY
The structure of relational liability is comprised of many substantive crimes and theories of liability, 218 all of which are determined by
four variables. First, this liability may be based in D’s assistance or
anticipation of A’s a. Second, D may be charged or uncharged with the
substantive crime in question. Third, the crime may be realized or unrealized. Fourth, D’s liability may be based on a simple theory or multiple theories compounded together. 219 Six categories of relational liability prevail in the case law.

A. Actor-Causer
“Actor-causer” liability inheres where D acts, and thereby causes a.
Actor-causer liability therefore includes direct, non-relational liability,220
but it also includes two other, more relational crimes: “kingpin” liability
under CCE and D’s liability for conspiracy where D was a conspirator.
A CCE kingpin conviction requires proof that a D (1) supervised or
organized five or more people, (2) committed a narcotics felony that
was part of a series of such felonies, and (3) thereby obtained substantial income or resources. 221 While kingpin liability resides in a relational context because it is based on a purposive collective including D
and others, the liability itself is not relational because it depends only
on what the D intended, did, and caused. In other words, kingpin liability requires proof of a relationship with others, but the core elements of the crime look only to the individual D’s mens rea, actus reus,
and causation.

217. While I implicitly argue that legislatures should apply the test for relational liability by repealing some relational liability crimes, I am not arguing—at least in this article—
that the test is one of constitutional magnitude that should compel legislatures or courts to act.
218. Aiding and abetting offers a good illustration of the difference between “crime” and
“theory of liability.” D may be charged with the substantive crime of aiding and abetting
under 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1951). D may also be charged with the crime of murder, which an A
committed, where the theory of liability is that D aided and abetted A in the murder.
219. I do not include felony murder in this list, because, while it ought to be subject to
the test for relational criminal liability, where appropriate, it is a highly complex system of
law itself, not least because it can be committed by one person alone, or vicariously through
another. See Guyora Binder, Felony Murder in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CRIME AND LAW
18, 22 (Markus D. Dubber ed., 2012).
220. As, for example, when D is charged with armed robbery because D entered a convenience store, held a gun to the clerk, and demanded and absconded with money.
221. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (2006).
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Along with most crimes that entail D’s mens rea, actus reus, and
causation, CCE “kingpin” liability is similarly justified. While CCE entails collective action, kingpin liability is premised upon D’s own intentional commission of a narcotics felony.222 The collective is relevant
only to provide an aggravating character to the defendant’s conduct.
In addition to CCE liability, D may be liable for a conspiracy she
engages in with A to commit a, as well as a itself where D committed
a. 223 Despite critiques of conspiracy liability, which are aimed mostly
at externalities, 224 these conspiracy charges are justified because proof
of conspiracy liability is based solely on a D’s mens rea (intent to conspire), actus reus (agreement with another to conspire), and causation
(because D’s intentional act in agreeing is a sine qua non, or but-for
cause, of the conspiracy). 225 The only relational aspect is that a co-conspirator must also agree to the conspiracy. And, in fact, the requirement that two people agree is not universal. In New York, for example,
a single person may “conspire” with an undercover government agent
who, of course, has no intention to commit any crime. 226

B. Charged Assistor—Realized
“Charged assistor—realized” liability attaches when D is charged
with assisting another in committing a crime that the other in fact
committed. This liability includes four crimes. First, D may be charged
with aiding and abetting A in A’s plan to commit a. 227 Second, D may
be charged with a as a co-conspirator, where the goal of the conspiracy

222. Id.
223. For example, one can be convicted of conspiracy to import marijuana as well as importation of marijuana. United States v. Cannington, 729 F.2d 702, 705, 713 (11th Cir. 1984).
224. These critiques mostly look to conspiracy law’s vagueness, its evidentiary problems,
its political nature, or the strategic purposes to which prosecutors put such charges. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 447-48 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); David B. Filvaroff, Conspiracy and the First Amendment, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 189 (1972); Abraham S.
Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405 (1959); Paul Marcus,

Criminal Conspiracy Law: Time to Turn Back from an Ever Expanding, Ever More Troubling
Area, 1 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (1992); Bernard D. Meltzer, Robert H. Jackson: Nuremberg’s Architect and Advocate, 68 ALB. L. REV. 55, 57 (2004); Morrison, supra note 37; Eric
A. Posner, Political Trials in Domestic and International Law, 55 DUKE L.J. 75, 82 (2005);
Francis B. Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1922).
225. But see Phillip E. Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CALIF. L. REV.
1137 (1973), for what may be the best critique of substantive conspiracy law.
226. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 105.30 (MCKINNEY 2016).
227. As, for example, where A plans to purchase drugs for resale, and D drives A to meet
a known drug dealer with the intent of helping A to purchase drugs.
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is a and A commits a.228 Third, D may be charged with being an accessory after the fact to A, who committed a.229 Fourth, D may be charged
with aiding and abetting a CCE kingpin. 230
As an initial matter, each of these crimes carries a mens rea of intent and actus reus of facilitation, so can be justified. 231 The reality,
however, may be less clear.
Aiding and abetting has been subject to different interpretations.
For example, the Second Circuit at one time took three divergent positions on aiding and abetting. 232 And it was as late as 2014 that the
United States Supreme Court defined the requisite actus reus and
mens rea for proof of aiding and abetting the use of a firearm during a
drug crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 233 In Rosemond v. United States,
the Court considered a D’s conviction for aiding and abetting an A’s
use or carrying of a firearm during a drug offense. 234 The Court held
that the D’s participation in the drug transaction as the actus reus235
and knowledge that his confederate would carry a gun as the mens
rea 236 were sufficient to ground aiding and abetting liability. Even with
this clarification, Justice Alito, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, noted that tension remains in Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the mens rea requirement.237 One thread, Justice Alito noted,
requires purpose or intent, and another thread requires mere
knowledge. 238 The Rosemond Court left the mens rea of recklessness
unaddressed, leaving a large unexplored gap between the extreme

228. As, for example, where D and A conspire to purchase drugs for resale, and D provides A with the name of a known drug dealer, and A sets up and makes the purchase from
the dealer.
229. As, for example, where A purchases drugs for resale, and after the sale D hides the
drugs for A’s protection and convenience.
230. As, for example, where D is a major drug dealer and provides drugs to a CCE kingpin. United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230, 1232 (7th Cir. 1989).
231. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 (1951), 3 (1994), 371 (1994).
232. One version allowed for liability if the defendant was merely aware that a crime would
take place; it did not matter whether the defendant facilitated or encouraged it. United States
v. Medina, 32 F.3d 40, 46 (2d Cir. 1994) (Citing caselaw for the proposition that “a defendant
aids and abets a violation of § 924(c) by planning a crime of violence with the knowledge that a
firearm will be used, regardless of whether the defendant committed any act to facilitate or
encourage the use of a firearm in relation to the underlying crime.” (citations omitted)). Another
version required the defendant to perform some affirmative act relating to the crime aided and
abetted. United States v. Giraldo, 80 F.3d 667, 676 (2d Cir. 1996). And a third version entailed
liability on a theory of constructive possession (where the crime was possession of a firearm).
United States v. Pimentel, 83 F.3d 55, 58-60 (2d Cir. 1996).
233. Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1247-48 (2014).
234. Id. at 1243.
235. Id. at 1247.
236. Id. at 1249.
237. Id. at 1253 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
238. Id.
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mens reas of intent and knowledge. To the extent that aiding and abet-

ting liability is premised on less than recklessness, it is not justified.
Aiders and abettors are also subject to liability as principals, exposing them to the same sentences as the A’s who actually performed a.
This suggests Yaffe’s concern regarding substantive liability and also
presents comparative and absolute retributivist justice questions.
These questions are particularly poignant when the charge is aiding
and abetting a CCE kingpin, which can lead to an aider and abettor
being charged as an organization leader, 239 where actual members of
the CCE are treated more leniently. 240
Co-conspirator liability may entail the same asymmetric authority
relationship, undermining its retributivist justifiability.241 Asymmetric authority relationships (those characterized by unequal power
among individuals) do not, however, negate intent—even the most impressionable co-conspirator must be shown to have intended to conspire and to commit the crime envisioned by the conspiracy, and to
have actually conspired. 242
The existence of asymmetric authority relations should not, furthermore, mean that the law should impose a regime of scaled culpability, in which all aiders and abettors and co-conspirators are per se

239. There is a circuit split as to this question. United States v. Pierson, 53 F.3d 62, 64
(4th Cir. 1995) (expressing doubt regarding kingpin liability for aiding and abetting); United
States v. Miskinis, 966 F.2d 1263, 1267-68 (9th Cir. 1992) (embracing liability); United
States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230, 1231 (7th Cir. 1989) (embracing liability, but highlighting the significant circuit split as to this question).
240. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d at 1231-32, 1236. Congress addressed this problem as to accessory after the fact, which set forth in statute that an accessory can receive a sentence of
only half the maximum term of imprisonment that the principal receives. 18 U.S.C. § 3
(1994). But the difference between aiding and abetting and accessory after the fact makes
sense for two reasons. First, accessories could not have prevented and did not contribute to
the principal’s crime, whereas aiders and abettors might have prevented and played causal
roles in the crime. Second, aiders and abettors are not invariably less culpable than principal
actors. Some aiders and abettors play such a causal role that their culpability is equal to or
greater than that of principals. See Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d at 1232 (aider and abettor was a
bigger drug dealer than the person he aided and abetted); Adam Harris Kurland, To “Aid,

Abet, Counsel, Command, Induce, or Procure the Commission of an Offense”: A Critique of
Federal Aiding and Abetting Principles, 57 S.C. L. REV. 85, 86 (2005). In contrast, it seems

unlikely that an accessory could contribute equally to the principal’s crime, already committed, or would have any incentive to take advantage of a principal.
241. Michael Bratman, one of the philosophers relied upon in Part III, explicitly supports
co-conspirator liability, but only where all co-conspirators are equal participants. BRATMAN,
supra note 115, at 63, 85 (putting aside conditions involving “asymmetric authority relations”).
242. United States v. Araujo, 310 F. App’x 21, 22-24 (7th Cir. 2009) (A drug conspiracy
defendant argued that his father was the supervisor of the conspiracy, and that the defendant was “an impressionable young man—in his early twenties at the time—unduly influenced by his father to enter the conspiracy.” The district court nevertheless found that the
defendant was an “integral” part of the conspiracy and gave no downward sentencing departure. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.).
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less culpable than their fellows who actually commit a. While committing an act may entail greater moral culpability than merely assisting
the act,243 it is also true that some aiders and abettors and co-conspirators are more culpable than those who actually commit a.244 Regimes
of scaled culpability would prevent judges from taking this into account. Retributivist justice, in the end, is not served either by mandating equal liability or scaled liability, but rather by judicial discretion
in sentencing. 245 And that, if anything, is a problem external to the
structure of relational liability. 246

C. Uncharged Assistor—Realized
“Uncharged assistor—realized” liability refers to a D who assists an
A in committing a crime that A in fact commits, but where D is not
formally charged with assisting it. This classification includes liability
where D is said to be liable for A’s doing a under a theory of aiding and
abetting or conspiracy, but where D was not formally charged with
aiding and abetting or conspiracy.247 For example, in one case a defendant was charged with and convicted of drunk driving.248 However,
she neither actually drove drunk nor was charged with aiding and
abetting another in driving drunk. 249 Instead, the implicit theory of
aiding and abetting enabled her conviction. 250
Using aiding and abetting and conspiracy as theories of liability,
rather than as formal charges whose proof will ground liability, makes
no difference in terms of internal justifiability. All other things being

243. Joshua Dressler, Reforming Complicity Law: Trivial Assistance as a Lesser Offense?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 427, 433 (2008).
244. Kurland, supra note 240, at 86.
245. To be sure, discretion is far from sufficient to ensure justice, since although it allows
for individualized sentences, it also entails dynamic and normatively unacceptable disparities, Phillip M. Spector, The Sentencing Rule of Lenity, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 511, 539 (2002),
has been blamed for the failure of at least one juvenile justice system, Carrie T. Hollister,
The Impossible Predicament of Gina Grant, 44 UCLA L. REV. 913, 924 (1997), and has been
referred to as lawless, MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER
(Hill and Wang New York 1972).
246. Discussed infra, Part V.
247. In United States v. Thirion, the defendant was charged with multiple fraud counts
and conspiracy, and was extradited from Monaco. United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146,
149-50 (8th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to the extradition agreement, the defendant could not be
tried for conspiracy. Id. at 151. The district court did not dismiss the conspiracy count, but
instructed the jury that it could not return a verdict on that count. Id. Nevertheless, the
court noted that conspiracy and aiding and abetting, even where not charged, can be bases
for substantive liability. Id. at 151-52.
248. State v. Byrd, 1986 WL 8850, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 15, 1986).
249. Id. at *1.
250. Id. at *2; accord Williams v. State, 352 S.W.2d 230 (Tenn. 1961).
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equal, the mechanism for determining liability doesn’t matter. 251 All
that matters is that the D acted with the requisite recklessness in support of A’s conduct.
To be sure, there are external procedural and constitutional problems
with basing liability on uncharged theories. First, basing liability on an
uncharged theory may violate a defendant’s due process right to fair notice.252 Second, double jeopardy and collateral estoppel issues emerge.
As to fair notice, courts usually hold that the failure to formally
charge a theory of liability entails no due process violation, 253 in part
because courts find that theories like aiding and abetting are always
implicitly attached to every substantive count.254 But this seems practically inaccurate. Wright v. State, 255 a 1985 Nevada case, shows why.
In that case, the defendant was arrested with two associates for robbing a casino in Las Vegas. 256 The defendant was ultimately convicted
of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon. 257 Early in the trial, the
State’s evidence was that the defendant himself carried the weapon.258
Well into the trial, however, one of the arrestees testified for the State
that the defendant was outside in the car during the robbery and was
not aware of the robbery until later.259 It was only during the closing
argument that the prosecution adopted an aiding and abetting theory,
arguing that the defendant was not in the casino during the robbery.
The jury was then instructed on aiding and abetting. 260 The Nevada Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defendant’s right to notice of the
aiding and abetting theory was violated. Indeed, Nevada is an exception
in requiring that such a theory be alleged in the indictment.261

251. In Nye & Nissen v. United States, the Supreme Court held that one could be charged
with a substantive offense, but convicted on either a conspiracy / Pinkerton or aiding and
abetting theory. Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618-20 (1949).
252. United States v. Lombardi, 138 F.3d 559, 561 (5th Cir. 1998).
253. United States v. Wrobel, 7 F. App’x. 723, 726 (9th Cir. 2001); State v. DeVerney,
592 N.W.2d 837, 846 (Minn. 1999).
254. United States v. Foreman, 87 F. App’x 107, 110-11 (10th Cir. 2004); United States
v. Walker, 621 F.2d 163, 166 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. White, No. 13-CR-10 JED,
2015 WL 1809686, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 21, 2015).
255. 701 P.2d 743 (Nev. 1985).
256. Id. at 743.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 743-44.
260. Id. at 744.
261. Id. at 745 (holding that the indictment should provide other information “as to the
specific acts on constituting the means of the aiding and abetting so as to afford the defendant adequate notice to prepare his defense”).
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Double jeopardy 262 and collateral estoppel issues 263 may arise when
aiding and abetting is charged as a crime, or is used as a theory of
liability for another crime. 264
As to double jeopardy, assume that the defendant in Wright was
acquitted of armed robbery as a principal, despite the prosecution arguing the aiding and abetting theory late in the trial. By arguing aiding and abetting as a theory, rather than formally charging it, the
prosecution would be able to charge the defendant in a later case for
the crime of aiding and abetting.265
As to collateral estoppel, assume that the prosecution explicitly advanced a principle liability argument and that the implicit aiding and
abetting theory was inherent. If the jury found the defendant not
guilty, the prosecution would be precluded from relitigating the issue
of whether the defendant was the principal in the armed robbery. It is
not clear, however, that the prosecution would be barred from later
charging the substantive crime of aiding and abetting. 266

D. Charged Anticipator
“Charged anticipator” liability arises when a D could have anticipated A’s commission of a crime and is charged with a crime that connects the D to the A. This classification includes four theories of liability: Pinkerton liability where conspiracy,267 CCE, 268 or RICO conspiracy 269 are charged, and liability for the natural and probable consequences of a conspiracy.270 These theories entail a D who is charged in
262. See United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d 148, 154 (1st Cir. 1991).
263. United States v. Kalish, 780 F.2d 506, 508 (5th Cir. 1986).
264. United States v. Zackery, 494 F.3d 644, 649 (8th Cir. 2007).
265. Double jeopardy prevents retrial for the same charge, not for a different charge
based on the same evidence. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 521 (1990); see also United States
v. McCall, 298 Fed. App’x 591, 593-94 (9th Cir. 2008) (where jury in a first trial received
instructions on co-conspirator and aiding and abetting liability, and prosecution failed to
prove conspiracy liability, double jeopardy did not bar retrial on aiding and abetting theory);
Ottomano v. United States, 468 F.2d 269, 271-72 (1st Cir. 1972) (no double jeopardy violation
where D was acquitted of conspiracy to sell cocaine, and later charged with and convicted of
selling cocaine on an aiding and abetting theory).
266. Christian v. Wellington, 739 F.3d 294, 300 (6th Cir. 2014); see also United States v.
Kendrick, 98 Fed. App’x 692, 694 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[C]onspiracy and aiding and abetting are
separate and distinct offenses, and an acquittal by general verdict on the conspiracy charge
does not generally preclude retrial on an aiding-and-abetting charge.”); United States v. Nelson, 599 F.2d 714, 716 (5th Cir. 1979) (“[T]he double jeopardy clause does not preclude prosecution for aiding and abetting a substantive offense subsequent to an acquittal on a charge
of conspiracy to commit that offense.”).
267. United States v. Meester, 762 F.2d 867, 873, 877 (11th Cir. 1985).
268. United States v. Michel, 588 F.2d 986, 999 (5th Cir. 1979).
269. United States v. Campione, 942 F.2d 429, 437 (7th Cir. 1991).
270. Wesley M. Oliver, Limiting Criminal Law’s “In for a Penny, in for a Pound” Doctrine, 103 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 8, 9 (2013).
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a joint criminal plan with A, where A commits a, which is not a goal of
the joint plan but could have been anticipated by D.
The Pinkerton doctrine imposes liability on D for the conduct of coconspirator A where that conduct is reasonably foreseeable and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 271 The natural and probable consequences
test imposes the same liability where A’s a is a natural and probable
consequence of the joint criminal plan. These doctrines have been
equated to each other 272 and are subject to the same analysis, and so I
treat them interchangeably.
These theories are criticized for imposing liability based on another’s criminal intent. 273 But this is not necessarily so, since any
agreement to commit a entails an implicit agreement to engage in conduct necessary to commit a. 274 For example, if D and A agree to commit
armed robbery of a bank, it seems uncontroversial that D should be
liable for the armed robbery that A commits, but also for A’s illegal
purchase of weapons, and probably also for A’s theft of a getaway car.
The critics of these doctrines respond not to the doctrines themselves, but to the virtually limitless extent of their application.275
Where, however, the application of these doctrines is appropriately
cabined, they appear quite justifiable. For example, the Ninth Circuit
has held that Pinkerton liability does not reach defendants who play
extremely minor roles in conspiracies.276 The Connecticut Supreme
Court has found that Pinkerton does not apply where the nexus between the conduct in question and defendant is sufficiently remote.277
And the Second Circuit has held that Pinkerton’s application in district court is entirely discretionary.278
271. United States v. Swiney, 203 F.3d 397, 401 (6th Cir. 2000).
272. Wilson-Bey v. United States, 903 A.2d 818, 835 (D.C. 2006).
273. Kimberly R. Bird, The Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine: “Your Acts
Are My Acts!,” 34 W. ST. U. L. REV. 43, 43 (2006); Matthew A. Pauley, The Pinkerton Doctrine
and Murder, 4 PIERCE L. REV. 1, 3 (2005).
274. The philosophers referred to in Part III recognize this. Bratman argues for joint
planning agency not only for conduct agreed to by two or more people, but also for meshing
“sub-plans.” BRATMAN, supra note 17, at 53. Margaret Gilbert finds that joint commitment
entails an “obligation” to act “as appropriate to the shared intention in conjunction” with
one’s cohorts. This means that each person is obliged to form “personal intentions that mesh
appropriately with those of the other party or parties.” GILBERT, supra note 11, at 108-09.
275. United States v. McClain, 934 F.2d 822, 826-27 (7th Cir. 1991) (“When application
of coconspirator liability is straightforward, a simple Pinkerton instruction may suffice. But
as the proof of Pinkerton liability becomes more complex, the instruction must provide a
higher degree of specificity . . . .” (citation omitted)). This is despite a purported due process
limit on imposing liability for attenuated conduct. United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830,
850 (11th Cir. 1985).
276. United States v. Bingham, 653 F.3d 983, 997 (9th Cir. 2011).
277. State v. Apodaca, 33 A.3d 224, 235 (Conn. 2012); State v. Coltherst, 820 A.2d 1024,
1036 (Conn. 2003).
278. United States v. Blackmon, 839 F.2d 900, 910 (2d Cir. 1988).
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Pinkerton and natural and probable consequences theories are not

always justifiable, however, because they leave open the possibility
that a D could be liable for negligently acting, or failing to act, to facilitate another’s criminal conduct—not recklessly acting, as the test for
relational liability requires.
This is a possibility because these bases of liability do not clearly
require any specific mens rea or actus reus. If negligence is defined
around that which is reasonable, then Pinkerton suggests a negligence
mens rea. But reasonableness language imports a negligence standard
if the foreseeability is objective and may import a recklessness standard if the foreseeability is subjective to the D.
Furthermore, Pinkerton and natural and probable consequences require no actus reus requirement. Instead, they presume that all members of a collective are responsible for certain conduct of other members, regardless whether the liable member facilitated the conduct or
otherwise acted.
Pinkerton and natural and probable consequences make it possible for
a D to be liable where she was negligent and did not act in relation to a
at all. In such cases, relational liability is unjustified. Where, however,
the theories require at least reckless facilitation, they are defensible.

E. Uncharged Anticipator
“Uncharged anticipator” liability inheres where a D could have anticipated A’s commission of a crime that A in fact committed, but D is
not charged with a crime that connects D to A. This classification includes four theories of crime: Pinkerton liability where no conspiracy
is charged,279 co-conspirator liability where no conspiracy is charged,280
vicarious responsibility, 281 and co-schemer theory.282
For example, both Pinkerton and co-conspirator liability may attach where the trier of fact finds that a conspiracy involving D and A

279. As, for example, where a D pleads guilty to attempted bank robbery and is convicted
of using a firearm in furtherance of a violent crime, under Pinkerton, based on evidence that
the A, not the D, used the firearm, even though conspiracy was not charged in the indictment. United States v. Zackery, 494 F.3d 644, 645-46, 648 (8th Cir. 2007).
280. Nickson v. Pliler, 400 Fed. App’x 209, 210 (9th Cir. 2010) (“It is long and firmly
established that an uncharged conspiracy may properly be used to prove criminal liability
for acts of a coconspirator.” (quoting People v. Belmontes, 755 P.2d 310, 334 (Cal. 1988))).
281. Ferguson v. Estelle, 718 F.2d 730, 735-36 (5th Cir. 1983) (The “shared purpose to
achieve jointly held illegal aims is the common thread among the diverse doctrines of vicarious criminal responsibility.”).
282. United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1184 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Under ‘coschemer
liability,’ a defendant who commits mail fraud is vicariously liable for all the acts of his coschemers in furtherance of the scheme, if the acts were reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.” (citing United States v. Stapleton, 293 F.3d 1111, 1116-17 (9th Cir. 2002))).
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existed, whether or not a conspiracy was formally charged. 283 Both of
these forms of liability are internally justifiable for the same reason
that uncharged assistor—realized liability is justifiable: because the
inherent culpability of the D does not depend on the mechanism for
determining liability. Of course, with this same internal justifiability
come the same procedural and constitutional problems.
Theories of “vicarious responsibility” 284 and “co-schemer” theory285
appear to be less justifiable. Vicarious responsibility expands upon
Pinkerton by maintaining the “in furtherance” requirement but dropping the “reasonable foreseeability” requirement. 286 This explicitly jettisons any mens rea requirement, thus violating the test for relational
liability. “Co-schemer” theory may be closely related in relevant parts
to Pinkerton liability, 287 but it has also been treated as true guilt by
association, with no requisite actus reus or mens rea on the part of the
D. 288 It has also been used as a catch-all theory of liability, applicable
where conspiracy liability may fail. 289 Co-schemer theory is, therefore,
defensible only if it tracks recklessness-based Pinkerton liability.

F. Charged Assistor—Unrealized
“Charged assistor—unrealized” liability attaches to a D who is
charged with a crime that connects her to A, where A’s alleged crime
is not charged or where A has been acquitted. This classification includes aiding and abetting liability where the crime aided and abetted

283. Zackery, 494 F.3d at 646; United States v. Rubenacker, 39 M.J. 970, 971-72
(A.F.C.M.R. 1994).
284. United States v. Bernard, 287 F.2d 715, 719 (7th Cir. 1961) (imposing liability on
“all joint venturers for all acts done and statements made in furtherance of the object of the
joint scheme or undertaking”).
285. United States v. Stapleton, 293 F.3d 1111, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2002); Baker v. United
States, 115 F.2d 533, 540 (8th Cir. 1940) (“The evidence conclusively shows that [the defendant] was a party to the scheme and even though a conspiracy is not charged, yet when such
a scheme is clearly participated in by more than one individual, it constitutes in and of itself
a conspiracy.”).
286. Bernard, 287 F.2d at 719.
287. Stapleton, 293 F.3d at 1115.
288. Baker, 115 F.2d at 540.
289. Reuben v. United States, 86 F.2d 464, 468-69 (7th Cir. 1936) (“The defendants are
not charged in the indictment with violation of the conspiracy statute, but they are charged
in apt terms with a unity of purpose and action in the alleged scheme to defraud and the use
of the mails. . . . One or more persons can originate and carry out a scheme to defraud and
any number of persons can operate the plan, each doing his part after the machinery is put
in motion; and it would be of no consequence that each and all did not actively participate in
the several acts of mailing if each were aiding and advising in the furtherance of the scheme.
While defendants were not charged with or tried for the specific offense of conspiracy, the
charges and proof herein very strongly supported many of the elements of conspiracy, such
as the asserted common scheme, the harmony of the actors, and their concert of action.”).
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is not charged or is acquitted 290 and conspiracy liability where the
crime envisioned by the conspiracy is not charged or is acquitted.291
The justificatory basis for these theories is that each D is liable for
her own intent and conduct, whether or not the a envisioned came to
be. 292 This makes sense where a D is charged with aiding and abetting
A, since the D is charged based on her own intent to assist and conduct
of assisting.
This theory also supports D’s conspiracy liability where A is not
charged with conspiracy but the trier-of-fact finds that such a conspiracy existed. Where an A is not charged with a crime, but D is charged
with aiding and abetting A or conspiring with A, legitimate exercises
in prosecutorial discretion may be at work. For example, A may be cooperating with law enforcement officials. Or A may have never completed any envisioned criminal act, but D’s intent to assist A made D
much more culpable than A.
Less justifiable would be D’s conviction for conspiracy in jurisdictions that require two or more people to commit conspiracy 293 and D’s
sole alleged co-conspirator has been acquitted of conspiracy. In such
cases the trier-of-fact would have found that the prosecution failed to
prove an agreement beyond a reasonable doubt, which is, in these jurisdictions, an element of conspiracy.294 With insufficient proof of a bilateral agreement should come an acquittal for conspiracy.
It might, however, make sense to charge a D—and no one else—
with conspiracy in jurisdictions that permit a one-person conspiracy.295
It might also make sense that in jurisdictions that require two or more
people to commit conspiracy, only one person could be charged (again,

290. Lugo v. United States, No. 09-cv-00696-NG, 2014 WL 7140456, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec.
12, 2014) (defendant was convicted of aiding and abetting his brother’s crime, even though
his brother was acquitted).
291. United States v. Thomas, 900 F.2d 37, 40 (4th Cir. 1990) (The defendant’s conspiracy conviction was affirmed, even though his sole alleged co-conspirator was acquitted. The
court rejected the inconsistent verdict claim, observing, “[e]nough evidence exists of a conspiracy between [the defendants] to uphold the jury’s verdict . . . .”).
292. United States v. Standefer, No. 78-1909, 1979 WL 4863, at *2-3 (3d Cir. Feb. 9,
1979) (“It is not necessary that the actual principal be tried or convicted, nor is it material
that the actual principal has been acquitted . . . . Each participant in an illegal venture is
required to ‘stand on his own two feet.’ ”).
293. As 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994) requires. In contrast, in New York one person may commit
the crime of conspiracy. There is no required meeting of the minds with a second conspirator.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 105.30 (MCKINNEY 2017).
294. Such liability would also contradict the philosophers’ opinion that collective responsibility requires joint commitment. BRATMAN, supra note 17, at 50; GILBERT, supra note 11,
at 89. The contrary argument is raised by Christopher Kutz, who might base relational liability on an individual’s “participatory intention,” which is housed in the individual as “an
intention to act as part of a group.” KUTZ, supra note 18, at 67.
295. See N.Y. PENAL CODE § 105.30 (MCKINNEY 2017).
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based on prosecutorial discretion or relative culpability). The normative boundaries of these charges will depend upon one’s epistemic interpretation of a jury acquittal and failure to charge. If an acquittal or
failure to charge means that an A did not commit the conspiracy in
question, then a D who is said to be in a conspiracy with that A cannot,
by definition, be in a conspiracy. But if an acquittal means that the
conspiracy charge against A was not proven, there may space for a jury
nevertheless to hold D responsible for conspiracy.

G. Compound
“Compound” liability attaches to a D through the applied combination of two or more theories of liability. Many of the theories of liability
discussed above have been combined to produce four types of
compound liability.
First, a D who aids and abets a conspiracy may be treated as a coconspirator for any subsequent Pinkerton liability. 296 In one case, for
example, D aided and abetted A’s substantive drug charges. 297 A was
part of a drug conspiracy. 298 D’s jury received a Pinkerton instruction,
allowing D to be found guilty for the substantive acts of the conspiracy
through Pinkerton, even though D was never found to be a part of the
conspiracy.299 This combination is indefensible from theoretical, retributivist, and procedural standpoints. 300
Theoretically, while the D may be liable for the conspiracy itself
because she aided and abetted it, she should not be liable for conduct
arising from the conspiracy. This is so because Pinkerton and natural
and probable consequences should assume that the crime in question

296. United States v. Vazquez-Castro, 640 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2011) (defendant charged
with conspiracy on an aiding and abetting theory, found guilty of a substantive charge on a
Pinkerton theory); United States v. Labbous Nos. 94-6169, 94-6181, 1996 WL 166691, at *4
(6th Cir. Apr. 8, 1996) (“A Pinkerton charge, that all members of a conspiracy are responsible
for acts committed by the other members, is appropriate even when the Defendant is charged
with aiding and abetting.”); United States v. Gonzalez, 933 F.2d 417, 446 (7th Cir. 1991)
(“Even if a jury had found only that [the defendant] ‘aided or abetted’ the conspiracy, there
is nothing that would have prevented it from also determining that [he] aided or abetted the
substantive crimes of his co-conspirators.”); United States v. Galiffa, 734 F.2d 306, 309-10
(7th Cir. 1984). But see Gonzales, 933 F.2d, at 445.
297. United States v. Comeaux, 955 F.2d 586, 591 (8th Cir. 1992).
298. Id. at 588.
299. Id. at 591; see also United States v. Jarvis, 335 Fed. App’x 845, 847 (11th Cir. 2009)
(A defendant who aids and abets a conspiracy is “criminally responsible for the [conspiracy]
to the same extent as the person who he assisted.”).
300. See United States v. Miller, 552 F. Supp. 827, 830 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (“When aiding
and abetting principles are combined with those of conspiracy, the law approaches the outer
limits of culpability based upon complicity.”).
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was reasonably foreseeable to a conspirator,301 who is presumed—by
virtue of her status as a conspirator—to have a requisite level of
knowledge regarding the conspiracy and its likely products such that
she can be said to intend, know of, and facilitate, or act recklessly in
regard to those consequences by participating in the conspiracy. The
same presumption should not be applied to non-conspirators—even if
they aid and abet the conspiracy.
This outcome also fails to satisfy retributivist principles. The test
for relational liability limits the applicability of Pinkerton and natural
and probable consequences to those D’s who themselves act or fail to
act in relation to a crime. A D who aids and abets a conspiracy acts in
relation to the crime of conspiracy, but not to any other conduct resulting from the conspiracy. This theory, therefore, holds that D is liable
for an act that D did not intend or cause, and whose action vis-à-vis
the crime is quite attenuated.302
This result is also procedurally problematic. The law appears to
permit Pinkerton liability to stand in where evidence supporting an
aiding and abetting conviction is absent.303 This is possible because
Pinkerton and aiding and abetting are theories of liability that may or
may not be formally charged in an indictment. Therefore, a D who is
charged under a conspiracy / Pinkerton theory that the jury does not
adopt may still be convicted under an aiding and abetting theory. In
turn, a D who is charged under an aiding and abetting theory (either
as a theory or as a substantive crime) that the jury does not adopt may
still be convicted under a conspiracy / Pinkerton theory.304
301. United States v. Fonseca-Caro, 114 F.3d 906, 907 (9th Cir. 1997) (Under Pinkerton,
“a co-conspirator is vicariously liable for reasonably foreseeable substantive crimes committed by a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy.”).
302. One can be charged with aiding and abetting the formation of a conspiracy, even
before the conspiracy exists. United States v. Portac, Inc., 869 F.2d 1288, 1291-93 (9th Cir.
1989); United States v. Ammons, 682 F. Supp. 1332, 1339 (W.D.N.C. 1988). One can also aid
and abet conduct that counts as predicate acts for a RICO conspiracy, and thereby be convicted of the conspiracy itself. United States v. Rastelli, 870 F.2d 822, 832 (2d Cir. 1989). The
same goes for aiding and abetting crimes that are predicates for a CCE conviction. United
States v. Miskinis, 966 F.2d 1263, 1268 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Aiello, 864 F.2d 257,
259 (2d Cir. 1988); see also State v. Coltherst, 820 A.2d 1024, 1036 (Conn. 2003); GILBERT,
supra note 11, at 80 (“[A]ny steps directed against a blameworthy collective must be taken
with extreme caution, on pain of harming numerous individuals who have little or nothing
to answer for in connection with that collective’s action.”); KUTZ, supra note 117, at 221.
303. United States v. Myrie, 479 Fed. App’x 898, 903 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Zackery, 494 F.3d 644, 649 (8th Cir. 2007).
304. Zackery, 494 F.3d at 649; People v. Robinson, 715 N.W.2d 44, 48-50 (Mich. 2006);
People v. Moreno, No. B144016, 2002 WL 31045375, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 2002). In
Commonwealth v. DeCillis, the defendant was acquitted of conspiracy to destroy a state police building. He was then charged with the substantive crime of destroying the building.
The Commonwealth planned to use the very same evidence as it had during the conspiracy
trial, but proceed on a joint venture theory, since it “had insufficient evidence as to which of
the participants actually broke the window and placed the bomb inside” of the building.
Commonwealth v. DeCillis, 669 N.E.2d 1087, 1088 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996). The appellate court
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The second theory entails liability for the substantive offense envisioned by a conspiracy (and not other reasonably expected but unintended criminal conduct, subject to a Pinkerton analysis) where the D
merely aided and abetted the conspiracy (and was not a co-conspirator). 305 This theory is defensible because the D will have aided and
abetted a plan to commit a crime. The D, therefore, will have intended
to facilitate the commission of that crime, satisfying prong one of the
test for relational liability.
The third theory consists of aiding and abetting the predicate acts for
a RICO conspiracy or CCE, in order to ground liability for the RICO
conspiracy 306 or CCE itself.307 This theory is indefensible because the D’s
intent and action extends only to the predicate act, not to the conspiracy
of which the act is a component. In assisting the predicate act, there is
no indication that the D knows of the conspiracy or intends to facilitate
it (if there is, then the D should be charged with aiding and abetting the
conspiracy). In the absence of knowledge about the conspiracy, the defendant cannot be said to be reckless as regards the conspiracy.
The fourth theory entails applying a “joint venture” theory of liability to a second prosecution, where a D was acquitted of conspiracy during a first prosecution, and the joint venture theory is based on the
very same evidence as the conspiracy charge. 308 This theory is internally defensible if the joint venture theory itself satisfies the test for
relational liability, but has external procedural and constitutional
problems involving collateral estoppel and double jeopardy.
V. EXTERNAL FAILURES
The structure of relational liability often has suffered misplaced
criticism because the critics aim their fire at the internal structure but
make arguments about external failures.309 To be sure, these external

upheld the prosecution, holding that acquittal of a substantive offense does not preclude
subsequent prosecution for conspiracy, and acquittal of conspiracy does not preclude subsequent prosecution on a substantive crime charge—even if the theory of liability closely tracks
that of the theory that originally failed. Id. at 1088-89.
305. United States v. Kasvin, 757 F.2d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 1985) (Seventh Circuit affirmed
a conviction based on jury instructions that “[o]ne can aid and abet a conspiracy without
necessarily participating in the original agreement,” and “[n]o fatal amendment to an indictment occurs where a defendant may have been convicted as a principal in a conspiracy by
aiding and abetting it even though he was not charged with aiding and abetting in the original indictment.”).
306. United States v. Rastelli, 870 F.2d 822, 832 (2d Cir. 1989).
307. United States v. Barajas-Diaz, 313 F.3d 1242, 1246 n.5 (10th Cir. 2002).
308. DeCillis, 669 N.E.2d. at 1088.
309. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 648, 650 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)
(criticizing Pinkerton for its expansive application and ease of proof as well as facilitation of
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failures mean that relational liability is often imposed where there is
no culpability. Reform efforts, however, must be based on an accurate
structural evaluation and targeted where reform is most needed.
This Article’s theoretical critique in favor of relational criminal liability, therefore, must be balanced against practical limitations. Relational liability in the real world is often just too vaguely seen, 310 or its
evidence just too unreliable, 311 to provide the basis for criminal liability. In addition, a defendant’s legal liability may rest on such an attenuated relationship between the defendant’s conduct and the bad outcome that the value of relational liability for retributivist and deterrence aims is fatally undermined.312 These practical, external arguments fall into three primary categories: the initiation of formal criminal charges, the often illusory limits of certain bases of liability, and
the fact that many bases of liability assume equal culpability between—and provide equal punishment for—D’s and the A’s who actually perform a.

A. Formal Criminal Charges
For two reasons, formal charging instruments such as indictments
and informations can present procedural and constitutional problems
that affect the imposition of relational liability.
First, while prosecutors must charge a crime in these instruments,
in federal jurisdictions they do not need to state their theories of liability in them. 313 Consider again the facts in Wright v. State, 314 in
which the D was charged with armed robbery and was tried on the
theory that he actually committed the robbery. 315 At the end of the
trial, however, the prosecutor argued, for the first time, the D’s liability

excessively broad prosecutorial discretion); Dressler, supra note 243, at 433 (criticizing regimes of equal liability between principals and accomplices); Goldstein, supra note 224, at
406-07 (highlighting the evidentiary difficulty in determining a conspiracy defendant’s mens rea).
310. Peter Margulies, Guantanamo by Other Means: Conspiracy Prosecutions and Law
Enforcement Dilemmas After September 11, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 513, 541 (2007-2008).
311. Kevin Jon Heller, Note, Whatever Happened to Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Of
Drug Conspiracies, Overt Acts, and United States v. Shabani, 49 STAN. L. REV. 111, 111 (1996).
312. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798-800 (1982) (White, J., plurality opinion).
313. United States v. Zackery, 494 F.3d 644, 646 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[J]ust as criminal liability based on aiding and abetting does not need to be specified in the indictment, criminal
liability based on Pinkerton does not have to be specified in the indictment.” (quoting United
States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1987)); United States v. Stapleton, 293 F.3d 1111,
1119 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[V]icarious liability for substantive counts . . . does not require that
the indictment charge conspiracy.”); United States v. Meester, 762 F.2d 867, 878 (11th Cir.
1985); United States v. Olweiss, 138 F.2d 798, 800 (2d Cir. 1943).
314. 701 P.2d 743 (Nev. 1985).
315. Id. at 744.
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as a mere aider and abettor. 316 Had the D been aware that this argument might be made, his defense could have looked quite different.317
Second, the label given to collectives or to the theory of liability—
conspiracy, aiding and abetting, joint venture, scheme, Pinkerton, and
so forth—mean little because the labels do not import any application
of distinct law, nor do they offer meaningful limits. Instead, all of these
labels function to link a D to an A through a purposive collective and
impose relational liability. 318 Predictable legal structures, with elements that prosecutors must meet and defense counselors know ahead
of time they must challenge, virtually do not exist. Rather, much of
relational liability allows prosecutors to shape charges and evidence to
their own purposes.319
There are four procedural or constitutional problems arising from
this situation, all of which, to be sure, have failed in court or have not
been tested.

316. Id.
317. The prosecution could have argued for liability based on a conspiracy theory as well,
to much the same prejudicial effect. Garcia v. Foulk, No. C 13–05237 BLF (PR), 2015 WL
2148031, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2015) (denying petition for writ of habeas corpus where jury
was instructed that it could convict a defendant of murder on any of four theories: “(1) he
was the actual perpetrator or an aider and abettor in the commission or [sic] murder or the
lesser include[d] offenses; (2) he aided and abetted assault with a deadly weapon and murder
was a natural and probable consequence of the assault; (3) he aided and abetted brandishing
a firearm, and murder was a natural and probable consequence of brandishing a firearm; or
(4) he conspired to commit the crimes of brandishing a firearm or assault with a deadly
weapon, and murder was perpetrated by a co-conspirator in furtherance of that conspiracy
and was a natural and probable consequence of the agreed upon criminal objective of that
conspiracy” (citations omitted)); Tomas v. Roe, No. 97–CV–0762 TW(LAB), 1998 WL
1045306, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 1998) (denying petition for writ of habeas corpus where
the “prosecutor proceeded on alternative theories of vicarious liability based on an uncharged conspiracy to commit the robberies and aiding and abetting in those robberies.” The
court denied the petition because it was well-settled that “an uncharged conspiracy may
properly be used to prove criminal liability for acts of a coconspirator”).
318. Coplin v. United States, 88 F.2d 652, 660-61 (9th Cir. 1937) (“When it is established
that persons are associated together to accomplish a crime or series of crimes, . . . . [i]t is not
the name by which such a combination is known that matters, but whether such persons are
working together to accomplish a common result.” (quoting 16 C.J. § 1283, at 646) (emphasis
omitted)); United States v. Black, 526 F. Supp. 2d 870, 883 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (“As a general
rule, co-venturers in a criminal scheme—whether labeled as co-schemers, co-conspirators, or
aiders and abettors—are jointly and severally liable for all proceeds generated under a fraud
scheme.”); United States v. Dukow, 330 F. Supp. 360, 364 (W.D. Penn. 1971) (“When two or
more parties are found to have joined in a common scheme, all are responsible for the acts
and declarations of each co-schemer in furtherance of the scheme while it is in progress, and
this is so regardless of whether conspiracy is charged in the indictment. When a common
scheme has been found to exist, the general rules of agency regarding joint liability are applied as a matter of evidence in determining guilt on the substantive counts.”).
319. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 447 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(“[C]hameleon-like” evidence of a conspiracy “takes on a special coloration from each of the
many independent offenses on which it may be overlaid.”).
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First, defendants may not receive fair notice of the charges they
face. Prosecutors can introduce novel theories of liability, even late in
the trial. 320 And courts have virtually foreclosed the possibility of a successful due process argument because variance (or constructive
amendment) is the basis for a fair notice claim, and variance arises
only when new charges, not new theories of liability, emerge during
the course of trial.321
Second, the right against double jeopardy may be violated, or at
least stressed. Although most courts have rejected double jeopardy
claims based on multiple theories of liability, others have expressed
concern. 322 For example, a single criminal agreement can give rise to
multiple conspiracy charges. 323 Both a RICO conspiracy and a CCE, for
example, can be charged separately.324 Furthermore, either one of
these charges can be based upon a theory of conspiracy or of aiding and
abetting the conspiracy. 325 And even where a conspiracy charge has
been dismissed, a defendant may still be liable for a substantive crime
through Pinkerton liability. 326
Third, prosecutors may alter theories of liability to suit their evolving needs throughout trial.327 The Second Circuit, for example, has
held that in RICO conspiracy cases “it is irrelevant whether a defendant agrees to commit the racketeering acts as a principal or as an aider
and abettor.” 328 But it surely is relevant to a defendant who proceeds
through pre-trial discovery, motions practice, and trial as though she
were alleged to be a principal, only to hear the prosecutor argue for the
320. United States v. Wrobel, 7 Fed. App’x 723, 724-26 (9th Cir. 2002) (Defendant convicted for wire fraud; conviction sustainable under a Pinkerton, aiding and abetting, or principal theory); United States v. Bernard, 287 F.2d 715, 719 (7th Cir. 1961) (Defendant charged
with tax evasion, evidence admitted on the theory of vicarious liability); People v. Williams,
302 P.2d 393, 395 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956) (Defendant charged as a principal, but convicted
on a theory of co-conspirator liability).
321. United States v. Vazquez-Castro, 640 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v.
Ashley, 606 F.3d 135, 141 (4th Cir. 2010).
322. United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1006 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[T]he Blockberger
test ‘is not easily applied to complex conspiracy prosecutions.’ ” (quoting United States v.
Solano, 605 F.2d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 1979))).
323. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 336-38 (1981); Phillips, 664 F.2d at 1007.
324. Phillips, 644 F.2d at 1014.
325. United States v. Cowart, 595 F.2d 1023, 1031 (5th Cir. 1979).
326. United States v. Chairez, 33 F.3d 823, 824, 828 (7th Cir. 1994).
327. United States v. McClain, 934 F.2d 822, 825 n.3 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Both defendants
objected to the Pinkerton instruction during trial. At first the instruction was discussed by
counsel and the district judge as if it were offered to facilitate the codefendants’ conviction
for the RICO conspiracy violation. When pressed by defense counsel as to whether combining
a Pinkerton instruction with a RICO conspiracy charge would be permissible, the government apparently altered its strategy, claiming alternatively that the instruction was proper
to allow the jury to convict Morgan Finley of the substantive acts of his alleged coconspirator,
Michael Lambesis.” (citation omitted)).
328. United States v. Rastelli, 870 F.2d 822, 832 (2d Cir. 1989).
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first time in closing argument that she may be convicted as an aider
and abettor. 329
Fourth, the grand jury’s authority to define charges is undermined.
For example, a grand jury might issue an indictment for a substantive
crime based on evidence that the D conspired to commit the crime. If,
however, the prosecutor’s conspiracy theory weakens with the post-indictment development of evidence, the prosecutor can easily switch to
an aiding and abetting, vicarious liability, or some other theory of liability. 330 Similarly, a D might be indicted for a substantive crime but
convicted for the conduct of others on a conspiracy theory (where conspiracy is uncharged).331 In these cases, it is unknown whether the
original grand jury would have signed off on the charges based on
these other theories of liability because the standards of proof of each
are different. 332

B. Illusory Limits
The structure of relational liability entails various limits to liability. In practice, however, these limits are often illusory. For example,
courts have doubted the value and definition of Pinkerton liability, 333
and line drawing for aiding and abetting is a dubious endeavor. 334
Combining Pinkerton and aiding and abetting concepts generates
additional confusion. In United States v. Davis,335 a defendant was
329. Wright v. State, 701 P.2d 743, 744-45 (Nev. 1985).
330. United States v. Stapleton, 293 F.3d 1111, 1116-17 (9th Cir. 2002). Some states
restrict this practice. See State v. Farrington, No. A-3398-05T4, 2010 WL 2010935, at *2
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 20, 2010); People v. Castro, No. 2657-2001, 2002 WL 1899928,
at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 1, 2002); Smith v. State No. W2012–00509–CCA–R3–HC, 2013 WL
5493549, at *1 (Tenn Crim. App. Sept. 30, 2013).
331. People v. Williams, 302 P.2d 393, 395 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956) (Defendant was “responsible as a principal for everything done by his co-conspirators, and the fact that a conspiracy
was not alleged in the indictment is immaterial.”).
332. United States v. Zackery, 494 F.3d 644, 649 (8th Cir. 2007).
333. One court lamented that Pinkerton “is not a usual criminal law concept [but is imported from negligence law] and surely not a concept that puts meaningful due process limits
on criminal liability.” United States v. Hansen, 256 F. Supp. 2d 65, 67 n.3 (D. Mass. 2003).
The Seventh Circuit has expressed that “the value of [a Pinkerton] instruction[] in the RICO
context is questionable.” United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 504 n.7 (7th Cir. 1986).
It also has questioned whether Pinkerton “really adds anything besides complication, given
the possibility of basing liability on aiding and abetting.” United States v. Manzella, 791
F.2d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir. 1986).
334. United States v. Messer, 900 F.2d 260, *3 (6th Cir. 1990) (“Drawing an exact line of
sufficient participation [in a scheme for aiding and abetting purposes] . . . is difficult if not
impossible.” (quoting Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954))); United States v.
Kasvin, 757 F.2d 887, 894 (7th Cir. 1985) (Swygert, J., dissenting) (noting that aiding and
abetting liability could extend to a drug addict who makes purchases from a drug conspiracy
for personal use).
335. 154 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 1998).
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charged with aiding and abetting the use of a firearm. 336 The jury was
instructed that it could convict based on either an aiding and abetting
or Pinkerton theory. 337 The Eighth Circuit found no error, implying
that aiding and abetting was a broader concept of liability that encompasses Pinkerton liability. Therefore, if any juror found the defendant
liable on an aiding and abetting theory, then the juror would certainly
find him liable under a Pinkerton theory.338
That is incorrect because each theory requires proof of unique elements. Pinkerton liability requires reasonable foreseeability and, sometimes, an act in furtherance of the conspiracy. 339 Aiding and abetting requires proof of specific intent to assist and actual assistance of the crime
in question. One theory does not encompass the other; claiming that it
does undermines the grand jury’s authority (which might have signed off
on an indictment based on one theory but not another) and risks conviction with jury unanimity and proof of every necessary element. 340
Furthermore, when courts apply both Pinkerton and aiding and
abetting theories to one criminal charge, they alternately distinguish
the two theories in order to provide the jury with two unique theories
of liability, each of which is able to stand on its own if the other fails,341
but they equate them in order to avoid the problem of non-unanimous
verdicts, as in Davis, above. 342 This combination of theories, of course,
raises the problem of multiplicity, pursuant to which a defendant may
be convicted on multiple counts that in fact comprise fewer crimes. 343
336. Id. at777.
337. Id. at 782.
338. Id. at 783.
339. 19 U.S.C. § 371 (2012) requires an overt act, but other federal conspiracy statutes
do not. Title 21 drug conspiracies, for example, require no overt act, United States v.
Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 11 (1994); United States v. Pumphrey, 831 F.2d 307, 308 (D.C. Cir.
1987), nor do some conspiracies to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization, see 18 U.S.C. §2339B (2006); United States v. Abdi, 498 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1064 (S.D.
Ohio 2007), nor conspiracies to commit money laundering, Whitfield v. United States, 543
U.S. 209, 211 (2005).
340. See United States v. Lucas, 932 F.2d 1210, 1220-21 (8th Cir. 1991).
341. United States v. Zackery, 494 F.3d 644, 649 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[I]t is well settled that,
‘[e]ven in the absence of evidence supporting an aiding and abetting conviction, persons indicted as aiders and abettors may be convicted pursuant to a Pinkerton instruction.’ ” (quoting United States v. Comeaux, 955 F.2d 586, 591 (8th Cir. 1992))).
342. United States v. Davis, 154 F.3d 772, 783 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[I]t is doubtful, under
the facts of this case, that a jury member found a defendant guilty of aiding and abetting in
the use or carrying of a firearm but would not have found that defendant culpable under
Pinkerton. If any juror who found the defendants guilty of directly aiding and abetting would
also find the defendants vicariously liable, then no unanimity problem exists because all of
the jurors would have at least agreed on the Pinkerton theory of guilt.”).
343. For example, in a different United States v. Davis, the defendant was charged with
conspiracy to commit rape and two counts of rape. It appears that the defendant did not
actually rape the victim; instead, he assisted another in doing so. United States v. Davis, No.
NMCM 9901170, 2003 WL 1537674, at *1-2 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 25, 2003). He was,
however, found guilty of two counts of rape: on one count because he conspired with the
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C. Equal Culpability
With the exception of accessory after the fact, relational liability
generally assumes equal culpability between Ds and As even where D
didn’t act to cause a but is held responsible for A’s doing a. The philosophers of collective responsibility reject this premise in practice, just
as Yaffe does in theory. Kutz, for example, would require an individual
accounting of liability, even in a collective context.344 Bratman
acknowledges the existence of relationships of “asymmetric authority,”
in which authority to act or make decisions is not equally apportioned
among members of a collective and which therefore calls for individualized assessments of liability. 345 And Gilbert observes that equal liability will unfairly harm members of collectives who “have little or
nothing to answer for in connection with that collective’s action.”346
Comparative culpability principles of retributivism would also suggest
that an A who performs a is, by virtue of that performance and all
other things being equal, more culpable than the non-acting D. 347
Where equal liability regimes exist, courts may be unable to assign
less culpability to D relative to A where D is truly less culpable and may
also be unable to assign more liability to a relatively more culpable D.
To the first point, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, some state
guidelines, and mandatory minimum sentences limit judges’ authority
to assign individualized culpability. In the federal system, if two defendants are charged with murder, where one is the principal and the
other aided and abetted the principal, both defendants will be assigned
the offense level for murder.348 While a D’s relative role in the offense
will aggravate or mitigate her sentence, 349 the difference is unlikely to
allow for condign punishment in many cases. Where the charge is murder, the aiding and abetting D’s base offense level will be 43,350 which,

rapist to commit the crime, and on another count because he aided and abetted the rape. Id.
at *2-3. In another case, a defendant was convicted of aiding and abetting an attempted firstdegree murder, conspiring to commit the murder, aiding and abetting an aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit the robbery. State v. Mincey, 963 P.2d 403, 405 (Kan. 1998).
The Kansas Supreme Court upheld the convictions, holding that aiding and abetting and
conspiracy have different elements, and are therefore not multiplicitous. Id. at 410.
344. KUTZ, supra note 117, at 49 (“Agents are often said to warrant mitigated responses
because they bear only a small degree of responsibility for a harm, or to be largely responsible
and hence deserving of especially hard treatment.”).
345. BRATMAN, supra note 115, at 85.
346. GILBERT, supra note 59, at 80.
347. Dressler, supra note 243, at 433.
348. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2X2.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014) (For
aiding and abetting, “The offense level is the same level as that for the underlying offense.”).
349. §§ 3B1.1-2.
350. § 2A1.1.
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assuming no other relevant facts, generates a sentence of life. 351 A D
who was a minimal participant in the murder will enjoy a four-point
reduction in her offense level,352 with a recommended sentence range of
262-327 months (21.8 to 27.25 years), and up to life if the D has a criminal history.353 While a judge may find that the aider and abettor is less
culpable than the actual murderer, the judge will often be discouraged 354—or, where mandatory minimums operate, prevented—from
mitigating the aider and abettor’s sentence to the appropriate length.
To the second point, theories of relational liability can be used to
impose more culpability on a non-acting D, but they may present additional procedural problems. In United States v. Benabe, 355 for example, a defendant was convicted of participating in a RICO conspiracy.356
Pinkerton was not used to determine guilt at trial but was used to determine the defendant’s sentence for, in part, four murders he was not
charged with at trial. 357 Although the Seventh Circuit mentioned its concern with using Pinkerton in the RICO conspiracy context, it found no
error, writing that Pinkerton or aiding and abetting theories could be
used at sentencing just as they are used at trial to determine guilt.358
VI. CONCLUSION
In 1998, George Fletcher contended that “[w]e no longer think
solely in terms of individuals acting solely on their own account but of
groups of people interacting in order to produce a crime of shared responsibility.” 359 He posed two important questions: are only individuals liable for a crime, and should we hold an entire group liable as a
group for the crime? 360
In this Article, I have argued that while individuals do act in collectives, they are ultimately liable as individuals. Flowing from that, we
should not hold an entire group liable as a group. To answer these
questions in any other way would upend American criminal law

351. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014).
352. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014).
353. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014).
354. Because, on appeal, sentences within Guideline ranges are presumed reasonable,
United States v. Brantman, 341 Fed. App’x 38, 39 (5th Cir. 2009), and courts imposing sentences outside these ranges must defend their decisions. See, e.g., Koon v. United States, 518
U.S. 81 (1996). Different standards of review for Guideline sentences and sentences that
depart from the Guidelines may further discourage departures. See United States v. Reed,
146 Fed. App’x 947, 950-51 (10th Cir. 2005).
355. 654 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2011).
356. Id. at 756.
357. Id. at 777.
358. Id. at 777-78.
359. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 189.
360. Id.
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norms, generate problems of proof and retributivist justice, and lead
to unacceptable guilt by association.
Fletcher’s questions abide in importance, even after more than
twenty-five years of philosophy on collective intentionality and
Fletcher’s recognition of a collective turn in our thinking because criminal law theory has never recognized relational liability as a special
part of criminal law. This liability has remained undertheorized and
untested and has therefore been the target of misplaced criticism.
To clarify this area and normatively assess it, this Article has assumed
an individual accounting, premised on an evaluation of each collective
member’s mens rea and actus reus. It rejects collectivist arguments as
unclear, anti-retributivist, and gateways to guilt by association.
To be sure, there is less daylight between individualist and collectivist camps than initially appears. For example, Bratman, Gilbert,
and Kutz contend with some type of collective reification, and Yaffe
and Ohlin acknowledge the practical need for some individualist accounting of liability.
This Article mediates the debate by advancing an individualist account of relational liability. This account responds to the collectivists
by accepting the practical reality of collective conduct and determining
individual liability in light of that reality. It responds to traditional
criminal law norms by locating liability squarely in the individual.
It also helps to resolve the debate by addressing the concerns of
both camps. As to the collectivists, Yaffe’s concern with the fiction that
D is held to have committed a crime, when A in fact committed it, is
avoided, since D and A are considered on their own. And Ohlin’s concern with imposing too much liability (if collectivism leads to vicarious
liability) or no liability (if group intent, not individual intent, is attended to) is resolved for the same reason. As to the individualists,
Bratman’s, Gilbert’s, and Kutz’s attention to the reality of groups is
brought on board since relational liability judges individuals in the
group context. Their accounts regarding when an individual should be
relationally liable are also attended to and given expression that is
practically applicable in criminal law.
In the end, an individualist account of relational liability has many
salutary implications. It treats individuals as individuals, even when
they act in groups; it degrades the possibility of guilt by association; it
is globally applicable (and not only to, say, Ohlin’s “tightly-knit” conspiracies); and it avoids reliance on the fiction of equal liability that
concerns Yaffe.

